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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is comprised of three essays. The first and third chapter explore possi-
ble causes of the falling U.S. labor share. They show, first, that labor-market concentration
is an implausible driver of the falling labor share and, second, that within-industry wages
are not keeping up with output. The second chapter ins concerned with private equity and
the financialization of the U.S. economy.
Using U.S. administrative data, Chapter 1 shows that the employment-weighted average
labor market concentration has been declining since 1980 – the opposite of the change
needed to explain the falling labor share. The relationship between wages and labor market
concentration has also weakened (become less negative) over that time. Together, these
results make labor market concentration an implausible driver of the falling labor share
despite a strong, negative relationship between labor market concentration and wages.
Chapter 2, work with Steven J. Davis, John Haltiwanger, Kyle Handley, Josh Lerner,
and Javier Miranda, studies the impact of U.S. private equity buyouts on firm-level em-
ployment, job reallocation, wages, and labor productivity. Our sample covers thousands
of buyouts from 1980 to 2013, which we link to Census micro data on the target firms,
their establishments, and millions of comparable firms and establishments that serve as
controls. Our results uncover striking differences in the real effects of buyouts, depending
on the nature of the target firm, GDP growth, and credit market conditions. Employment
at target firms shrinks by nearly 13% relative to controls over two years in buyouts of
vi
publicly listed firms but expands by 11% in buyouts of privately held firms. Slower GDP
growth after the buyout brings lower employment growth at targets (relative to controls),
as does a widening of credit spreads. Buyouts lead to productivity gains at target firms rel-
ative to controls nine percentage points, on average, over two years post buyout. Tighter
credit conditions at the time of the buyout are associated with much larger post-buyout
productivity gains in target firms. A post-buyout widening of credit spreads or slowdown
in GDP growth sharply curtails or reverses productivity gains in public-to-private deals.
Chapter 3 documents that the falling labor share comes entirely from decreases of
within-sector labor shares while industrial-output reallocation and changes in self-employed
output have counteracted some of the effect. Additionally, the decline in Manufacturing’s
contribution to the aggregate labor share is almost exactly offset by the increase in Services’.
vii
CHAPTER I
Labor Market Concentration Does Not Explain
the Falling Labor Share
DISCLAIMER: “Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the au-
thor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results
have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.” (Project 1686
Disclosure Requests 7185, 7033, 7008, 6988, & 6967)
1.1 Introduction
Economists and policy makers are worried about the falling labor share and stagnating
wages. In his address at the 2018 annual Fed conference in Jackson Hole, WY, Alan
Krueger (Krueger , 2018) cites recent papers showing that labor market concentration is
negatively correlated with wages. The authors of these papers extend their arguments to
connect labor market concentration and the declining labor share. The non-representative
nature of the data used by these studies, however, raises doubts about their conclusions
1
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concerning the contribution of labor-market concentration to changes in the labor share.
This paper examines the connection between the labor share and labor market concen-
tration using U.S. administrative data covering all urban, private, non-farm employment,
from 1980 to 2012. I find that labor market concentration is an implausible driver of
the falling labor share. The employment-weighted average labor market concentration has
been declining since 1980 – the opposite of the change needed to explain the change in
the labor share (or stagnant wages). Not only has the employment-weighted average labor
market concentration declined, but the relationship between labor market concentration
and wages has also weakened over the period of this study. Taken together, these results
show that changes in labor market concentration has not caused the falling labor share.
In order to connect labor market concentration and the labor share, I first develop a
model connecting a labor market’s concentration to its wages. In this labor market, firms
decide how many people to employ knowing how their employment decision will affect wages
and knowing other firms’ desired hiring. The model implies a negative relationship between
a labor market’s concentration and its wages. I then test and confirm this model-implied
relationship.
After confirming the relationship between labor market concentration and wages, I re-
late wages to the labor share. The labor share is the percent of aggregate output that
goes to compensating labor and therefore is based, in part, on aggregate wages. Each
labor market’s wages need to be employment-weighted to properly aggregate them into
average wages. By using the model-derived relationship between labor market wages and
labor market concentration, I show that the employment-weighted average labor market
concentration is the relevant measure to link labor market concentration and aggregate
wages, and, therefore, the labor share. The time series of the employment-weighted av-
erage concentrations, however, goes in the opposite direction of that needed to explain
3
the falling labor share. While contemporaneous papers have demonstrated the same re-
lationship between labor market concentration and wages and have shown average labor
market concentration has been decreasing, this is the first paper to explicitly connect the
link between these phenomena and the labor share.
Labor market concentration’s decline concurrent with product market concentration’s
increase, and the link between increased product market concentration and lower wages
argue for the continued use of the so-called consumer welfare standard of anti-trust reg-
ulation. Adopting a regulatory standard based on labor market concentration instead
of product market concentration would solve a problem (increasing labor market concen-
tration) that does not exist in the data (Naidu et al., 2018; Marinescu and Hovenkamp,
2018). The employment-weighted average labor market concentration is the amount of
labor market concentration faced by the average U.S. worker. The time series of the
employment-weighted average concentrations shows that labor market concentration is a
decreasing problem for this average worker. Additionally, it could block productivity-
enhancing mergers because of increased concentration in relatively small labor markets,
affecting relatively few workers, and in essence, prioritize these small negative effects over
national benefits.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 describes this paper’s relationship to other
papers in the falling labor share and in the concentration and wages literatures; Section
1.3 develops the model relating wages to labor market concentration; Section 1.4 describes
the data; Section 3.4 presents the findings of the paper; Section 1.6 presents results on
sub-periods and extends the model to include product market power; and Section 3.5
concludes.
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1.2 Concentration and Labor Share: Relation to the Liter-
ature
This paper contributes to a growing literature connecting the falling labor share to
concentrating markets. Autor et al. (2017) and Kehrig and Vincent (2017) argue that
concentrating output markets has pushed production into lower labor share firms, thereby
depressing the labor share. Meanwhile Barkai (2016) and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017)
argue that concentrating output markets has increased mark ups and the additional value
generated has gone into profits, thereby increasing the capital share to the detriment of
the labor share. Instead of examining product market concentration, this paper focuses on
labor market concentration and shows that while product markets have been getting more
concentrated, labor markets have been getting less concentrated. This finding is consistent
with national chains’ replacing local firms. If national chains have a lower labor share
than local firms, then national chains’ replacing local stores would drive down the labor
share as described in Autor et al. (2017) and Kehrig and Vincent (2017). This paper also
provides evidence that increasing product market power can decrease wages. If increased
national concentration has created more product market power, then product market power
decreasing the labor share would be consistent with Barkai (2016) and De Loecker and
Eeckhout (2017). This paper does not provide evidence for or against any of these studies
of national concentration, but should be considered complementary to them.
A quickly growing subset of the literature examines the relationship between labor
market concentration, wages, and macro trends. This paper’s main contributions to this
literature are its universal industrial coverage, its long panel of industries, and its direct
link between labor market concentration and the labor share. It is most closely related
to Benmelech et al. (2018), Azar et al. (2017), Azar et al. (2018), and Rinz (2018) but is
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significantly different from each in important ways. It uses more industries than Benmelech
et al. (2018) and so provides insight into the macro-economy as opposed to a single industry;
it uses a longer time series than either Azar et al. (2017) or Azar et al. (2018) and uses
actual employment data rather than advertised jobs and so provides insight into the trend of
employment concentration; and it directly examines the relationship between labor market
concentration and the labor share so answers a different question than Rinz (2018) (though
Rinz employs similar techniques and data sets).
By using administrative data from 1980-2012 for all non-farm private industries, this
paper is able to examine general trends in labor market concentration instead of focusing on
a particular industry. Benmelech et al. (2018) focuses its analysis solely on manufacturing.
Because there are qualitative differences between manufacturing’s average and employment-
weighted average labor market concentration and the aggregate’s, they mistakenly conclude
that labor market concentration is an increasing problem. This qualitative difference can
be understood in terms of manufacturing’s declining role in U.S. employment: according
to the BLS, the percentage of employment engaged in manufacturing dropped from about
22% in 1980 to just over 10% in 2012.
In addition to the broad industrial scope of this paper, its data allow it to examine the
trends in labor market concentration; to calculate concentration using actual employment,
independent of firm advertising behavior; and to examine the correlation of wages with
the labor market concentration instead of relying on advertised wages in a selected sample
of two job boards. Both Azar et al. (2017) and Azar et al. (2018) use online job posting
data to calculate labor market concentration and estimate its relationship with posted (as
opposed to realized) wages. They are, therefore, limited in terms of the accuracy and
comprehensiveness of their sources. Azar et al. (2017) uses CareerBuilder.com data for
2010-2012. Beyond this paper’s inability to look at trends, there are questions about the
6
representativeness of these data and how to interpret them. Not every job is posted on
Careerbuilder.com– Azar et al. (2017) only examine jobs in 26 SOC occupation codes–and
only about 20% of postings contain wage information, raising concerns about selection into
posting on the website and, conditional on posting on the website, selection into posting a
wage.1 Azar et al. (2018) uses a more comprehensive online job postings data from Burning
Glass Technologies (BGT), but limit themselves to a single year–2016. Within these data,
40% of job postings have missing employer information.2 While these papers define labor
markets using occupation codes rather than industry codes, it is unclear which of these
is the more appropriate labor market definition, or in fact, whether or not a “correct”
definition is even possible. This issue will be discussed further in Section 1.4.2.
Once I have estimated the relationship between labor market concentration and wages,
and demonstrated the time series trend, I use these empirical facts to examine how labor
market concentration has affected the labor share over the study’s timeframe. Rinz (2018)
uses the same data as this paper and finds the same dynamics: local labor market concen-
tration has been declining while national concentration has been increasing. He uses these
facts to examine earnings outcomes of different types of workers and earnings mobility.
Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2018) uses NETS (National Establishment Time Series) to calcu-
late national and local sales concentrations from 1990 to 2014. NETS provides microlevel
data on US establishments. While NETS is closely related to the data used in this study,
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Barnatchez et al. (2017) question its coverage. This paper
1This paper additionally calculates concentration as “the share of vacancies of all the firms that
post vacancies in that market.” Without knowing the underlying firm behavior–how is the share
of job postings within CareerBuilder.com correlated with the share of employment in a given labor
market?–it is impossible to interpret the concentrations they calculate. Finally, because there is no
measure of labor market employment, the average concentration calculated in this study gives equal
weight to small labor markets and large labor markets. The simple average presented, therefore,
tells us nothing about the concentration facing average workers.
2It is unclear how many observations have wage data. The qualifications about differences in
firm behavior and the relationship between actual wages and advertised wages also apply.
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calculates concentration in employment instead of sales and uses the relationship between
concentration and wages to examine how labor market concentration is related to the labor
share. Despite these differences in data source, the overall trends in Rossi-Hansberg et al.
(2018) are consistent with both Rinz (2018) and this paper: though nationally calculated
concentration has increased over the period of study, local trends move in the opposite
direction.
In addition to these recent papers, there is an older literature relating labor market
concentration to wages that produced mixed results. Boal and Ransom (1997) survey
the state of the literature until 1997 and point out that in some studies labor market
concentration is highly correlated with wages while in others the correlation disappears.
These studies, however, cover relatively few labor markets–the papers they cite vary from a
few hundred to a few thousand labor markets–and mostly focus on either nurses or teachers.
Additionally, most of these are cross-sectional studies. This paper uses a panel data set
with approximately 6.9 million different markets. The panel allows the relationship between
labor market concentration and wages to be identified from within-labor market variation
instead of relying on cross-sectional variation–a feature driven by the theory developed
in this paper. Using only the within-labor market variation also mitigates concerns that
the correlation between labor market concentration and wages reflects differences between
labor markets i.e. low-productivity labor markets have low wages and few firms therefore
creating a correlation between the labor market concentration and wages.
1.3 Linking Labor Market Concentration and Wages
In this section I lay out a simple model of labor markets in which the market’s wage
depends on its level of concentration. I then discuss the basis of the model’s assumptions
8
and connect the model to the parts of this study’s empirical specification regarding the
choice of concentration measure and the variation used to estimate the relationship between
labor market concentration and wages. Later in Section 1.6.2, the model is extended to
include product market power along with labor market concentration.
1.3.1 Model
There are N firms in the labor market, indexed i = 1, ..., N . Firms produce output
with a linear production technology in labor. Each firm receives a productivity draw, ai
around a common component , Ā. The productivity draws across firms are mean zero,
i.i.d., and ai ∈ [−ā, ā] with ā < Ā so that all firms have positive productivity. Firm i’s
productivity is thus Ai = Ā+ ai.
Labor supply is given by a constant-elasticity labor supply function common to all
firms. Let li be firm i’s employment and let L =
∑N
i=1 li be the total employment in the




where w(L) is the wage and ε is the elasticity of labor.
Each firm chooses its employment to maximize profits knowing the other firms’ desired
hiring and the labor supply curve,
max
li
Aili − w(L)li. (1.2)
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This maximization leads to each firm’s first order condition
Ai − w(L) = w′(L)li. (1.3)






− 1 = ε−1si (1.4)
where si =
li
L is firm i’s share of employment in the labor market. Multiplying by si,


















i is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), a commonly used measure of market
concentration.3 Taking logs and rearranging finally yields







− log(1 + ε−1HHI), (1.6)
the relationship between the wages and the labor market concentration.








In this expression, the total size of the labor market is directly related to an invertible
3The HHI ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 being a perfectly competitive market and 1 being a single
firm in the market.
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function of the total productivity in the market. This one-to-one relationship between
market size and productivity will be useful later in the paper when proxying for potentially
omitted variables. This expression depends only on the parameters of the model and does
not depend on HHI because entry & exit are not endogenously determined. Had they been,
then the concentration would influence the size of the total labor market.
1.3.2 Discussion
The preceding model establishes a direct link between wages and labor market concen-
tration, but other features of the model are worth noting. This section will discuss these
features and link the model to the empirical specification.
The firms’ productivities are made up of a common component and an idiosyncratic
component. The common component groups the firms’ productivities while the idiosyn-
cratic component creates a productivity distribution within the labor market. This spec-
ification is meant to match the firm sorting found in the economic geography literature:
firms choose locations to be in close proximity to other firms of a similar productivity
level. This phenomenon is economically important. Gaubert (2018) finds that nearly half
the productivity advantage enjoyed by cities in France is due to firm sorting. The com-
mon component also helps determine the variation needed to estimate the model. log(Ā)
in Equation 1.6 translates into a labor market fixed effect in the empirical specification.
This fixed effect means the relationship between wages and labor market concentration is
identified using the within-market variation. Section 1.5.1 will discuss in more detail the
advantages of this empirical strategy.
Equation 1.4 shows that a firm’s profits are related to the labor supply elasticity and
to the firm’s relative size in the market. The left-hand side of the equation is the mark up
over wages, the only cost in the model. In this setting, as a firm becomes more productive,
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all else being equal, it will earn a higher mark up and employ a larger share of the labor
market. The right-hand side of the equation is the product of the labor supply elasticity
and the firm’s share of the labor market. This expression determines how much of the
additional productivity is captured by workers as a firm’s share of the labor market, and
therefore its productivity, increases. Weighting Equation 1.4 by the share of labor market
employment and summing across all the firms leads to Equation 1.5. Here, the total per-
employee profit of the labor market is related to the total labor market concentration as
measured by the HHI.
Finally, Equation 1.6 shows that wages are related to the labor market’s total produc-
tivity along with the market fixed effect and concentration. Unfortunately, while the data
set used for the main analysis contains firm employment and wage data, it has no infor-
mation about productivity. Equation 1.7 relates a product market’s productivity directly
to the size of the total labor market. This relationship provides a natural proxy for the




The main source of data for this study is the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD). The LBD covers the near-universe of non-farm, private establishments
with employees. For each establishment, it provides the total number of employees and the
total pay of the establishment as of March 13 of the given year. Hence, only establishment-
average wages can be calculated from the data. Longitudinal links are created using a
variety of methods. Jarmin and Miranda (2002) provide full details of the construction of
12
the LBD.
Because this study defines labor markets to exclude rural areas, it does not use the full
LBD. Figure 1.1 shows the total jobs covered in each year, from 61 million jobs in 1980 to
104 million jobs in 2012. The full sample has about 850 cities and about 600 industries. It
is important to note that not every city will have every industry code and not every year
has 850 different cities.
Panel (a) of Table 1.1 gives summary statistics for the full sample. There are 6.94
million observations in the complete sample. Each observation is a labor market. The
average HHI over the entire sample is about 0.55 and the average of the outcome variable,
ln(Aggregate Wagemt), is 9.833. The average ln(employment) is 3.652 which corresponds
to about 37 employees in each labor market, and there are an average of 19 firms in each
labor market. Finally, Annual Markets is the average number of markets in each year of
the sample period. Standard deviations are below the averages in parentheses.
1.4.2 Defining the Extent of the Market
The first step in examining labor markets is defining labor markets. This paper defines
labor markets as industries within an urban area. Based on this definition, firms operating
multiple establishments within a labor market are counted as one and firms operating in
multiple industries are counted separately. Undergirding these decisions is the premise that
firms within a labor market compete with each other for labor. The rest of the section lays
out the details around these choices.
This paper uses 5-digit NAICS industrial codes for its industrial classification. The
NAICS industrial codes are applied to establishments based on the economic activity that
the greatest number of employees are engaged in at that establishment. This classifica-
tion philosophy constrasts with the older SIC classifications that assign industry codes
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based on what the establishments’ parent company does. By way of example, employees
at a warehouse whose parent company is in manufactoring would be correctly identified as
working in a warehouse under NAICS codes but would be wrongly classified as manufac-
turing workers under the SIC coding. In fact, Fort and Klimek (2016) show that using SIC
codes misclassifies a significant number of workers. The Census Bureau provides the estab-
lishment level industry identification developed in Fort and Klimek (2016) to researchers
using the LBD.
The difference between NAICS and SIC codes is important for labor markets. Using
classifications more closely aligned with the economic activities at the establishments allows
more-similar establishments to be grouped more easily. Establishments engaged in the same
economic activity presumably compete for the same employees and so are in the same labor
market. This definition contrasts with studies that use SIC codes. Using SIC codes, or
assigning a single NAICS code to all of a firm’s establishments, is appropriate in studies
of product market concentration because they are measuring the total labor that goes into
making the firm’s final output. Studies of labor markets, like this one, however, need to
differentiate the types of labor that go into production. This study accomplishes this by
using establishment level NAICS codes then aggregating to firm level employment.
While there remains significant debate around whether to use industry or occupation
codes (and at which code level), the current empirical evidence shows that these differences
do not threaten the conclusions of this paper. Therefore, for a study such as this, the
importance of these differences may be overblown. The argument presented in Section 1.5.2
only relies on the negative relationship between labor market concentration and wages, and
on the decrease in average concentration since the beginning of the analysis period. Shifting
labor market definitions will certainly change the point estimates presented in Table 1.3,
but these point estimates are not the main focus of this paper - the signs of the estimates
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are. These signs are negative in this paper; they’re negative in Rinz (2018), which uses
NAICS 4 code; they’re negative in Benmelech et al. (2018) which uses NAICS 3 codes in
manufacturing; they’re negative in Qiu and Sojourner (2019), which uses NAICS 4 codes
to impute occupational concentration; and finally they’re negative in Azar et al. (2017) and
Azar et al. (2018) who use jobs posting data and occupation codes. The negative correlation
between wages and concentration is extremely robust and arguing about definitions does
not change this basic fact. Additionally, every paper with a long enough time frame, and
representative data, shows that local concentration has been decreasing over this time
frame (this paper, Qiu and Sojourner (2019); Rinz (2018); Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2018),
etc.). Taken together, these results mean that differing definitions of labor market do not
threaten the main arguments and findings of this paper.
These differences, however, are extremely important for papers whose main argument
focuses on the point estimate for a concentration equation. Unfortunately for these authors,
it is likely impossible to select the “right” definition of labor market. The main argument
has been between industry definitions and occupation definitions, however, ? shows that
both industrial and occupational human capital matter and which matters more depends
heavily on the occupation and on the industry. This means that neither definition truly
captures “labor markets,” and point estimates that rely heavily on these definitions will
always be subject to debate. I will ignore these issues in later discussions about estimates
because, again, the negative relationship between labor market concentration and wages is
robust to these definitions even if the point estimates are not.
The second component of labor market definitions is geographic. Firms in economically
integrated areas presumably compete for the same workers while firms in areas that are not
economically integrated do not. Urban areas (CBAs, CBSAs, and Micropolitan Areas, the
successors to MSAs, referred to as cities from now on) make the most natural geographic
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definition for a labor market because they are local definitions created by the OMB based on
the economic integration of cities and their surrounding areas. Recent evidence suggests
this generalization is a good approximation of labor markets. Within the US, internal
migration has been declining (Partridge et al., 2012; Molloy et al., 2014). Additionally,
Manning and Petrongolo (2017) and Marinescu and Rathelot (2016) provide evidence of
the local nature of job search among potential employees. Finally, moving is expensive.
Bartik (2017) finds the adjustment costs to moving (including non-pecuniary costs) are
over $100,000.
Once the local nature of labor markets is accepted, however, there are still several
ways to define them: cities, commuting zone, or county definitions could all be called
“local.” On closer analysis, however, only the urban area definition are appropriate for
a study like this one. Commuting zones are designed by the USDA to incorporate rural
areas into the closest city as measured by economic integration. The city definitions,
however, are already based on economic integration. Though the rural areas might be
most integrated into the particular city in their commuting zone, they are not integrated
enough to be included in the initial urban area definitions. That is, they are not integrated
into their assigned cities and are most useful in studies that need to cover the entire
U.S. land mass. Foote et al. (2017) shows using this over-broad definition of local labor
markets can affect empirical estimates. While commuting zones are too large, counties
are too small. Counties are political units. They are not based on the economic realities
of the area and many cities are made up of multiple counties. Using a county-based
definition of labor markets suggests that firms in different counties don’t compete with
each other for labor. For example each of New York City’s five boroughs is its own county.
County-based labor market definitions imply restaurants in Brooklyn and Manhattan do
not compete for employees. Because cities’ definitions are based on economic integration
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instead of political boundaries or geographic proximity and they allow competition within
those areas of integration, they are the most natural choice for a study of labor markets.
Cities themselves are not static. The OMB periodically updates its definitions of cities to
reflect which areas are economically integrated in a particular year. This study uses these
changing MSA definitions because they are the best measure of what the labor market was
like in that particular year. Concerns that these changing geographical definitions’ driving
later results are addressed in Section 1.5.2.
Having a definition for labor markets allows me to define the firms operating in those
markets. The Census Bureau creates a unique firm identifier that connects all of a firm’s
establishments (for those firms with multiple establishments) and provides enough geo-
graphic data to locate each establishment within an urban area. Many firm identifiers are
linked to establishments in multiple labor markets, to multiple establishments in the same
labor market, or both. For the purposes of this study, a firm is a firm identifier and labor
market combination. This firm definition allows firms to operate in multiple labor markets
within the same city and to compete for various types of workers. Firms (firm identifier
by labor market) that operate multiple establishments within the same labor market are
considered as a unit so the employment at these multiple establishments is aggregated into
one firm to calculate concentration. Underlying this aggregation are 2 assumptions: first,
establishments do not make hiring and pay decisions independently of each other and sec-
ond, establishments owned by the same firm do not compete with each other for employees.
These assumptions are in line with the discussion of wage decision making in Bloom et al.
(2015a) where they echo the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ assumption that, “the firm level
is more consistent with the role of corporations as the economic decision makers than each
individual establishment.”
Using these definitions of labor markets and firms, I can calculate labor market concen-
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tration. This study’s model suggests (Section 1.3) using the HHI as its measure of labor
market concentration. In this context, the HHI is the sum of the squared shares of the








is the fraction of employment employed at firm i in labor market M and
LM =
∑N
i li,M is the total employment in labor market M .
In addition to a measure of concentration, this study needs a measure of wages within
the labor market. The theory presented earlier does not allow for wages to differ across
firms. This assumption contrasts with an extensive literature on wage dispersion (see
Mortensen (2005) for a summary of the literature to 2005). To best mimic a common
component of wages that is affected by the labor market’s concentration, I calculate the









where pi is the total pay at firm i. This value is alternatively calculated as the total pay
within a labor market over the total labor in that market. I refer to this as the aggregate
wage to distinguish it from the average wage at a particular firm pili . This distinction is
important for interpreting results later in Section 1.5.1.
1.5 Specification and Results
This section presents analysis using the data described in Section 1.4.1 and the defi-
nitions described in Section 1.4.2. The first section describes the regression analysis and
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shows that the relationship between labor market concentration and wages is the same in
these data as suggested by the model in Section 1.3. The second section connects labor
market concentration to the labor share and shows that it is an implausible driver of the
decline in the labor share.
1.5.1 The Relationship between Wages and Concentration
Methodology
The theory in Section 1.3 relates the log of wages to a fixed effect, a measure of market-
level productivity, and a non-linear function of the labor market’s concentration. In keeping
with that theory, I use a market-level regression specification for my analysis:
log(wmt) = α+ αt + αm + β1HHImt + β2HHI
2
mt + β3Ψmt + εmt (1.10)
where wmt is the aggregate wage, αt is a time fixed effect so the results can be interpreted
in real terms, αm is a labor market fixed effect, HHI
2
mt is the square of the labor market’s
concentration measure to accomodate the nonlinearity of the log() function in Equation 1.6
and Ψmt are labor market level controls meant to manage the variation in average wages
that comes from the second term of Equation 1.6. As controls I use the log of total labor
market employment, log(empmt) and the number of firms in the market, N . I cluster
standard errors at the labor market level.
The controls and fixed effects alleviate some possible concerns with this regression
analysis. The first possible concern is the omitted productivity term from Equation 1.6
(the second term) which shows that labor market productivity is positively correlated with
the wages. If the labor market productivity is negatively correlated with the concentration
(more productive markets have lower concentration levels) this will introduce a negative
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bias into the estimate. If, on the other hand, labor market productivity is positively
correlated with the concentration, omitting the variable will introduce a positive bias in
the estimate. I use the log of the total labor market employment, ln(empmt), to proxy
for market level productivity because the size of the labor market is a direct result of the
market’s aggregate productivity in the model as shown in Equation 1.7.
In addition to concerns about the omitted productivity variable, there are concerns that
the negative correlation between wages and the labor market concentration is driven by
some third phenomenon. The two most obvious possible confounders are the relationship
between the number of available jobs and the number of firms, and between-labor market
productivity.4 If the the number of available jobs depends directly on the number of firms
and is positively correlated with wages but negatively correlated with the concentration of
the labor market (if there are fewer jobs available in a more concentrated labor market)
then the results of regressing wages on concentration could reflect this relationship. I use
the number of firms in the market, N , to control for this possibility, assuming that getting
an available job is a function of N , e.g. one could worry that finding an available job in
a labor market with more firms is systematically easier than finding an available job in a
labor market with fewer firms, even if both markets have exactly the same concentration
ratio.
Cross-sectional correlation between productivity and wages could also confound esti-
mates of the relationship between labor market concentration and wages.5 However, be-
4Interestingly, search frictions are likely to be negatively correlated with labor market concen-
tration. In a highly concentrated market, e.g. a 1 mill town, people will know exactly where to
look for a job. Those jobs may not exist at the firm at that point, but that failed job-match is not
due to search issues.
5This relationship assumes that more concentrated labor markets are less productive than less
concentrated labor markets, or that there is a negative correlation between labor market concen-
tration and productivity. While no current research exists on this relationship, there are some
clues as to its existence. First, labor market size and concentration are negatively correlated. This
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cause of the panel structure of these data, I am able to include the labor market fixed effect
corresponding to log(Ā) in Equation 1.6. This fixed effect eliminates all the between-group
variation from the estimate, i.e. the coefficients of interest, βHHI and βHHI2 , are estimated
using only the time series variation within a labor market. This estimation strategy helps
alleviate some of the concerns that the relationship between the wage and the level of
concentration reflects the relationship between area productivity and wages. One possible
concern with this strategy, however, is whether there is enough variation in the time series
of the HHI within labor markets to make accurate estimates. Because the average standard
deviation of the HHI within a market is 0.119, this concern is unwarranted.
Results
Table 1.3 presents the regression results from estimating Equation 1.10 with various
combinations of fixed effects and controls. All of the relationships presented in the table are
significant to the 1% level. The first specification uses time and labor market fixed effects
and does not include the market-level control variables. These results are in Column
(1). The marginal effect at the mean is -0.2434. Going from the mean concentration
level (.5499) to 1 standard deviation (.3517) above the mean, all else remaining equal,
is associated with a decrease in log(wages) of -.0907 or about -8.6%. The specification
in Column (2) replaces the time fixed effect with time-by-city and time-by-industry fixed
effects. Instead of controlling just for national trends, these additional fixed effects control
for city trends and for national-industry trends, respectively. Adding these fixed effects
attenuates the effect at the mean; it drops from -0.2434 to -0.1867. In this specification,
relationship is most obviously seen in Figures 1.2 and 1.5. The equal weighted average labor market
concentration is always higher than the employment weighted average labor market concentration.
The weights and the concentration are therefore negatively correlated. Secondly, labor market size
and productivity are positively correlated (Gaubert , 2018). While these opposing correlations do
not guarantee that productivity and concentration will be negatively correlated, they are suggestive.
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going from the mean concentration to one standard deviation above the mean, all else
remaining equal, is associated with a decrease in log(wages) of .0768 which corresponds to
a 7.7% decrease in wages.
Columns (3) and (4) display the results of adding controls to the fixed effect structures.
Column (3) only has time and market fixed effects while column (4) has market fixed effects
and time-by-industry and time-by-city fixed effects. Adding the additional controls atten-
uates the relationship between concentration and wages slightly: the marginal effect at the
mean is about .017 smaller in Column (3) than in Column (1) and is about .02 smaller
in Column (4) than in Column (2). This attenuation is in keeping with market employ-
ment’s proxying for market productivity and correcting the negative bias from the omitted
variable. The positive coefficients on ln(emp) also support this interpretation. The model
suggests employees in more productive markets should make more money. Interestingly,
the coefficients on N are negative. Holding constant the labor market’s concentration and
the overall employment of the market while increasing the number of firms in the market
must decrease the average firm size. Lower wages are therefore correlated with smaller
firms. Thus, these negative coefficients are in line with the well-known firm-size effect
described in Oi and Idson (1999).
Because I am using a second order Taylor series expansion for − log(1+ε−1HHI), I can
use βHHI and βHHI2 to obtain estimates of ε
−1, the inverse elasticity of labor. The second
order Taylor series expansion for this function is
− log(1 + ε−1HHI) ≈ γ − ε
−1
1 + ε−1 ¯HHI
(HHI− ¯HHI) + ε
−2
2(1 + ε−1 ¯HHI)2
(HHI− ¯HHI)2,
(1.11)
where γ is a constant and ¯HHI is the point around which the function is expanded. Col-
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Using the estimates from Table 1.3 and Equation 1.14 delivers values for the implied inverse
labor market elasticity, ε−1. The coefficients in specification (1) and (3) imply ε−1 = .4 and
ε−1 = .23, respectively. These correspond to an elasticity of labor between 2.5 and 4. There
are two different but observationally equivalent interpretations of this elasticity. First, it
can be interpreted as the average elasticity of the labor supply faced by firms. Second,
it can be interpreted as the labor supply elasticity of employees making a non-dynamic
labor supply decision. Further complicating the interpretation of the implied labor supply
elasticity is that the unit of observation in this data set is jobs as opposed to hours. In
any case, however, these estimates should not be interpreted as estimates of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. Finally, Specifications (2) and (4) include controls for the total
size of the labor market. The labor supply elasticities implied by these specifications are
negative because labor supply is not allowed to adjust normally.
1.5.2 The Relationship between the Labor Share and Concentration
While the preceding section connected labor market concentration to wages, I have yet
to say anything about the labor share. This section makes the connection between labor
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market concentration and the labor share and shows the labor market concentration is not
driving the falling labor share.












where w is average compensation, L is total employment, P is the price level and Y is total
output, wL is the total compensation paid to labor while PY is the total value of output.
The third expression in Equation 1.15 shows that the labor share is the ratio of real wages,
w






The aggregate real compensation in Equation 1.15 is the employment-weighted average
of the real compensation in all of the labor markets in the U.S. That is, for M labor markets















where ωm is the total compensation in labor market m, and Lm is the employment in labor
market m. Here, ωmLm is the same as the wage calculated in Equation 1.6 because the model
does not distinguish between wages and compensation. Inserting the relationship between







where f(·) is a nonlinear function, Γm,t is a vector of variables other than the labor market
6The notation in the following switches from HHI to h because using HHI makes several of the
following equations completely unreadable.
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concentration that determine wages in market m at time t and ht is the labor market
concentration in market m at time t. Because of the non-linearity of the exp(), there is not
a simple decomposition for changes in ω. However, taking the first order approximation of
the expression around the points h̄ and Γ̄, and rearranging the expression yields












Substitute ζ(h̄, Γ̄) ≡ exp(f(h̄, Γ̄))(1−fh(h̄, Γ̄)h̄−fΓ(h̄, Γ̄)Γ̄), δ(h̄, Γ̄) ≡ fh(h̄, Γ̄) exp(f(h̄, Γ̄))
and ψ(h̄, Γ̄) ≡ fΓ(h̄, Γ̄) exp(f(h̄, Γ̄)) to get











Note that ζ(h̄, Γ̄), ψ(h̄, Γ̄), and δ(h̄, Γ̄) are time invariant functions of h̄ and Γ̄. Equa-
tion 1.19 demonstrates that, to a first approximation, the aggregate compensation de-
pends on the employment-weighted average concentration of the labor markets and the
employment-weighted average of Γ, the other variables that determine wages within the
labor market. Using this approximation, the change in aggregate wages due to changing
labor market concentration is














Because ψ((h̄, Γ̄)) does not depend on hm,t, it is invariant to changes in the labor market
concentration. It therefore does not factor into changes in the labor share due to change
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in labor market concentration.
Figure 1.2 shows the time series of the employment-weighted average labor market
concentration from 1980 to 2012. The employment-weighted average labor market con-
centration has decreased since 1980. Because fh(h,Γ) < 0, δ(h̄, Γ̄) < 0. Therefore, this
time series trend is the opposite of what is needed to explain the declining labor share. Of
possible concern, however, is that this decline in the employment-weighted average labor
market concentration is caused by the changing geographic definitions. Rinz (2018), how-
ever, contemporaneously finds similar local dynamics using both the Commuting Zone and
the County definitions of labor markets. Since Rinz ’s paper, several other papers including
Qiu and Sojourner (2019); Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2018) have found similar dynamics using
various datasets, including NETS (the National Establishment Time Series) and the LBD.
These similar findings show that the direction of the changes in the employment-weighted
average labor market concentration is not driven by changing geographical definitions.
Figure 1.3 shows the component of the labor share driven only by changes in the
employment-weighted average labor market concentration. I calculate δ(h̄, Γ̄) using the
estimates of Equation 1.10 in Column (2) of Table 1.3 for the coefficients on ¯HHI, the
mean of the labor market concentration for h̄, and have set Γ̄ = 0 so that individual time
and market components do not affect the aggregate trend. These choices lead to
δ(h̄, Γ̄) = (−.0875− 2 · .0411 · .55) exp(−.0875 · .55− .0411 · .552) = −.173. (1.21)
The regression analysis of Section 1.5.1 links the labor market concentration with wages
instead of total compensation. According to the BLS’s Employment Costs for Employee
Compensation (ECEC) survey,7 however, wages made up 73% of total compensation in
7Available from the BLS https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/#tables
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1986 (the first year of data) and 69.3% of total compensation in 2012. While wages’ share
of compensation has declined slightly, as long as both wages and other benefits respond to
labor market concentration in the same way, this calculation makes sense. The calculation
starts .63 based on the labor share in 1980 in the Penn World Table.8 This graph makes
it clear that the employment-weighted labor market concentration is moving in the wrong
direction to cause the falling labor share.
The aggregate trend in employment-weighted average labor market concentration, how-
ever, masks qualitative differences in industry trends. Figure 1.4 shows the employment-
weighted average labor market concentration by industry. It shows that the employment-
weighted average labor market concentration has increased in retail trade, manufacturing,
wholesale trade, and finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE). The employment-weighted
average labor market concentration, however, has fallen in services and transport, ware-
housing and utilities. Because services has become a much bigger employer within the U.S.
economy, its decreasing employment-weighted average labor market concentration helps
drive the aggregate trend. Examining the employment-weighted average labor market con-
centration is tantamount to examining the labor market concentration faced by the average
U.S. worker. The implication of Figure 1.2 is that the average U.S. worker is facing a lower
labor market concentration today than he did 30 years ago. Additionally, the trend in
manufacturing is especially interesting because it is the trend identified and explored in
Benmelech et al. (2018). However, because they focus on manufacturing and ignore the
employment weighting needed to examine the aggregate, their conclusions are incorrect.
The time series dynamics of the employment-weighted average labor market concentra-
tion is not only driven by the shifting work force. Figure 1.5 shows that the equal-weighted
8Available from the St. Louis Fed: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
LABSHPUSA156NRUG
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average labor market concentration has also decreased from 1980 to 2012. This aggregate
trend also covers qualitative differences among industries. Figure 1.6 shows the equal-
weighted average labor market concentration by industry.
The preceding discussion focused entirely on the relationship between aggregate real






, labor productivity. If local labor market concentration is
a measure of monopsony power, and monopsony in labor markets increases labor pro-
ductivity, then the employment-weighted average labor market concentration would have
to increase in order to reduce the labor share. However, both the employment-weighted
average and equal-weighted average labor market concentrations decrease over the time
period.
1.6 Extensions
This section provides extensions to the main analysis of the paper. First, I examine the
relationship between labor market concentration and wages through time and find that has
weakened (become less negative). Second, I extend the model presented in Section 1.3 to
incorporate product market power as well as labor market concentration. When product
market power is included, the relationship between wages and labor market concentration
is increased. The results of this extension are consistent with the literature on increasing
product market concentration as a measure of product market power driving the falling
labor share.
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1.6.1 Labor Market Concentration and Wages Through Time
While Section 1.5.2 shows that the time series of labor market concentration moves
in the opposite direction necessary to explain the falling labor share, this analysis was
based on a static relationship between wages and labor market concentration. If, however,
the relationship between labor market concentration and wages has been strengthening,
that is, getting bigger in absolute value terms, then labor market concentration could still
be driving the falling labor share. This change is tantamount to δ(h̄, Γ̄) in Section 1.5.2
becoming more negative. To examine this possibility, I divide my sample into sub-periods
and regress wages on concentration. I find that the relationship between labor market
concentration and wages has also weakened over the period of study.
Table 1.2 shows the summary statistics for each sub-period: the number of observations,
the average HHI9 and the employment-weighted average HHI. The number of observations
goes up monotonically, but the average HHI and employment-weighted average HHI are
remarkably stable. As before, the standard deviations are in parentheses underneath the
mean.
The specification I use for this analysis is
log(wmt) = αit + αct + αm + β1HHImt + β2HHI
2
mt + εmt. (1.22)
I have dropped the additional labor market controls because they do not change the esti-
mates much but have included the city-by-time and the industry-by-time fixed effects. The
results of the regression are presented in Table 1.5. Most importantly, the marginal effect
at the mean has been decreasing since the earliest sub-periods. Figure 1.7 emphasizes this
result. It shows the time series of the marginal effect at the mean of HHI on wages. The
9I am switching back to HHI because readability is not an issue in the discussion that follows.
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effect at the mean is getting closer to 0. These results allay any fears that changes in the
relationship between labor market concentration and wages could be driving the declining
labor share.
1.6.2 Adding Product Market Power
Another possible concern with regressing wages on labor market concentration is that
product market power could contaminate the estimated relationship. In this final extension
of the analysis, I control for product market power by dividing firms into local and tradable
industries. Implicitly this assumes that product market power is uncorrelated with local
labor market concentration for firms operating in tradable goods. I allow the output good
to have a price P (q) that depends on the quantity produced and q =
∑N
i=1 qi. Because
P (q) is the inverse demand curve, P ′(q) < 0. Firms have the same production technology
and information as described in Section 1.3. Additionally, firms know how their production
will affect the price of their output good. The firm’s first order condition is then
P ′(q)A2i li + P (q)Ai − w′(L)li − w(L) = 0 (1.23)
which leads to
log(w) = log(Ā) + log
(

















Because of the additional marginal revenue term, the relationship between the concentra-
tion, HHI, and the wage is now more negative. Intuitively, in these markets, firms have
incentives to restrict their hiring because of the profits they will earn in both the product
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market and the labor market.
The definitions for tradable versus local goods come from Delgado et al. (2015). Their
methodology classifies each 6-digit NAICS classification as either tradable or local. Local
industries are those whose employment is more evenly distributed throughout the country
because the goods and services are location-based like food service and retail. Tradable in-
dustries, on the other hand, are more geographically concentrated. Because these industries
can ship their goods, they are able to cluster more readily and benefit from agglomeration
externalities. The analysis in this paper uses 5-digit NAICS and the Delgado et al. (2015)
classifications are at the 6-digit NAICS level. This mismatch creates an additional category
in this analysis: “Both.” There are potentially 10 6-digit NAICS categories in each 5-digit
NAICS category. If all of the 6-digit NAICS codes within a 5-digit code belong to the
same classification, then the 5-digit code gets that classification. If, on the other, there are
conflicting 6-digit classifications, then the 5-digit NAICS code is designated “Both.”
In the regression specification, I allow all variables to vary by tradable, local, or both.
The exact specification I use is
wmt = α+ β1HHImt + β21[Local] ∗HHImt + β31[Both] ∗HHImt + β4HHI2mt+
β51[Local] ∗HHI2mt + β61[Both] ∗HHI2mt + β7Ψmt + β81[Local] ∗Ψmt+
β91[Both] ∗Ψmt + εmt
where α is various fixed effects, 1[·] is an indicator function, and Ψmt is the set of
market-level controls for total employment and the number of firms in the market. The
fixed effects structures mirror those in Section 1.5.1.
Table 1.4 presents the results from this regression. In all the specifications, the esti-
mated coefficient β̂1[Local]∗HHI is negative and significant at the 1% level indicating that, in
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line with the theory, wages in industries that produce local goods have a stronger relation-
ship with the labor market concentration than wages in industries that produce tradable
goods or industries that produce both. Additionally, the estimated coefficient β̂
1[Local]∗HHI2
is positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications indicating that while local
goods producers have a stronger first order effect of concentration on wages, these effects
are less non-linear than in tradable goods. Column (2) shows the results of the specification
without additional controls but with city-by-time and industry-by-time fixed effects. In
this estimate, tradable goods’ relationship between wages and labor market concentration
has a small, but not statistically significant, main effect of the relationship between their
wages and the labor market concentration (-.0227) but a large nonlinear effect (-.1479).
Local goods, however, have the opposite relationship. The main effect of concentration
on wages for local goods producing industries is large (-.1434 = -.0227 + -.1207) and the
nonlinear effect is much smaller (-.0394 = -.1479 + .1085). The results in specifications (3)
and (4) follow the same pattern–local goods have stronger relationship between wages and
concentration than tradable goods do.
These findings are in line with the current literature on product market concentration.
Product market concentration has been increasing, and if this increase in concentration is
accompanied by an increase in product market power, it would decrease the labor share
as in this model extension. This line of reasoning matches that in Barkai (2016) and in
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017). Additionally, the negative relationship between labor
market concentration and wages is robust to controlling for product market power, even if
it contaminates the initial point estimates.
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that labor market concentration is an implausible driver of the falling
labor share. The time series trend in employment-weighted average labor market concentra-
tion moves opposite to what is needed to explain the falling labor share, and the relationship
between wages and labor market concentration has not strengthed. Additionally, product
market concentration is a plausible driver of the falling labor share as its time series trend
moves in the right direction and product market power intensifies the relationship between
wages and labor market concentration.
Taken together, these results suggest labor market concentration is a diminishing, not
an increasing, problem for U.S. workers. Recent calls to update regulatory regimes to
incorporate or prioritize labor market concentration in order to respond to the falling
labor share and stagnating wages are, therefore, premature and unsupported by the data.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
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Table 1.3: The relationship between HHI and aggregate wages with controls
Dependent Variable ln(Aggregate Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β̂HHI -0.1982*** -0.0875*** -0.2257*** -0.1170***
[0.0116] [0.0105] [0.0119] [0.0105]
β̂HHI2 -0.0411*** -0.0902*** -0.0007 -0.0456***





Obs 6940000 6940000 6940000 6940000
R2 0.4432 0.5759 0.4437 0.5762
Marginal Effect at the Mean -0.2434 -0.1867 -0.2265 -0.1672
Effect of 1 SD Increase from Mean -0.0907 -0.0768 -0.0797 -0.0644
Time FE X X
Industry×City FE X X X X
Time × City FE X X
Time × Industry FE X X
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Table 1.4: The relationship between HHI and aggregate wages with controls, tradable
vs local
Dependent Variable ln(Aggregate Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β̂HHI -0.1154*** -0.0227 -0.1619*** -0.0875***
[0.0170] [0.0159] [0.0171] [0.0159]
β̂1[Local]∗HHI -0.1665*** -0.1207*** -0.1658*** -0.0638***
[0.0236] [0.0215] [0.0240] [0.0215]
β̂1[Both]∗HHI 0.1397*** -0.0308 0.1155** -0.0762
[0.0512] [0.0468] [0.0523] [0.0466]
β̂HHI2 -0.1119*** -0.1479*** -0.0362*** -0.0686***
[0.0125] [0.0117] [0.0126] [0.0117]
β̂
1[Local]∗HHI2 0.1438*** 0.1085*** 0.0842*** 0.0379**
[0.0177] [0.0161] [0.0179] [0.0161]
β̂
1[Both]∗HHI2 -0.0895** 0.0496 -0.0586 0.1001***













Obs 6940000 6940000 6940000 6940000
R2 0.4432 0.5759 0.4441 0.5763
Marginal Effect At .55, Tradable -0.238 -0.202 -0.185 -0.163
Marginal Effect At .55, Local -0.247 -0.275 -0.187 -0.185
Time FE X X
Industry×City FE X X X X
Time × City FE X X














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.1: Total employment covered by sample, 1980-2012, in millions
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Figure 1.2: Employment-weighted average labor market concentration since 1980
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Figure 1.3: Change labor share due to changes in employment weighted average labor
market concentration using estimated coefficients
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Figure 1.4: Employment-weighted average labor market concnetration since 1980 by
industry
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Figure 1.5: Average labor market concentration since 1980 calculated within labor
markets
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Figure 1.6: Average labor market concentration since 1980 by industry, NAICS 5
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Figure 1.7: The marginal effect of labor market concentration on wages through time
CHAPTER II
The Social Impact of Private Equity Over the
Economic Cycle
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We study real-side outcomes at firms acquired in U.S. private equity buyouts. Our
sample covers thousands of buyouts from 1980 to 2013, which we link to Census micro
data on the target firms, their establishments, and millions of comparable firms and estab-
lishments that serve as controls. Our large sample, long time period, high-quality data,
and ability to track firms and establishments afford an unusually informative investigation.
Broadly speaking, we find that private equity (PE) buyouts accelerate job reallocation,
raise productivity, and reduce wages in target firms relative to contemporaneous devel-
opments at control firms. There are, however, striking and systematic differences in the
effects of buyouts, depending on the nature of the target firm, prevailing credit market
conditions, and GDP growth in the broader economy. The number and volume of private
equity (PE) buyouts expanded greatly in recent decades (Kaplan and Stromberg (2009)),
directly touching a sizable share of U.S. employment (Davis et al. (2014)). Buyout activity
collapsed during the financial crisis of 2007-09 but recovered strongly in recent years, as
we show. Proponents see buyouts as engines of efficiency and value creation, fueled by the
concentrated ownership of target firms, highly levered capital structures, and high-powered
financial incentives (e.g., Jensen (1989)). Critics see a very different picture. In their view,
heavy reliance of debt financing and an intense focus on investor returns lead to negative
effects on target-firm performance and on the jobs and wages of their workers2. We develop
a wealth of evidence that speaks to the claims of critics and proponents alike. Our study
also speaks to broader concerns about financialization of the economy. The financial sectors
share of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from less than four percent in 1950 to
eight percent in 2010, accelerating after 1980, as documented by Philippon (2015). He also
2For a review of the controversies, see Appelbaum and Batt (2014) and Davis et al. (2014).
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provides evidence that the cost of financial intermediation has changed remarkably little
since the nineteenth century, despite dramatic advances in information technology that
might be expected to lower the costs of creating, pooling, holding, and trading financial
assets. Zingales (2015) argues that the financial sector is prone to agency problems and
other inefficiencies that create a range of distortions in the real economy, many of which are
poorly understood and neglected by scholars. We cast new light on how one increasingly
important form of financialization affects economic performance. Our study also speaks
to the effects of fluctuations in credit availability, which have long worried economists
(Kindleberger (1978)). One concern in this regard involves the incentives that drive credit
decisions. In Rajan (1994)s model, for example, the desire to manage short-term earnings
drives bankers to make value-destroying loans in good times and curtail lending abruptly
in bad times. A second concern involves the banking systems capacity to supply credit.
Bernanke and Gertler (1987) develop a theory in which negative shocks to bank capital
cause them to forego value-creating loans. A third set of concerns surrounds the effects of
credit availability on non-financial firms. According to the financial accelerator mechanism
in leading macro models (e.g., Bernanke et al. (1999)), endogenous swings in credit avail-
ability amplify and propagate the effects of shocks to the macroeconomy. Credit availability
and debt levels are a key focus in many post mortems of economic crises from the 1870s to
the 2000s (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Campello et al. (2010); Schularick and Taylor
(2012)). They are also a first-order concern for modern central bankers. We develop new
evidence on how target-firm performance relate to credit market conditions at the time
of the buyout and afterwards. We are far from the first to consider relationship between
buyouts and credit cycles. Pioneering work by N. and Stein (1993) presents evidence that
fits a specific version of the overheated buyout market hypothesis [that] the buyouts of the
later 1980s [were] both more aggressively priced and more susceptible to costly financial
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distress. Twenty-five of 66 deals in their sample executed during the easy-credit period
from 1986 to 1988 later underwent a debt default, an attempt to restructure debt, or a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. In glaring contrast, only one of 41 deals executed from
1980 to 1984, when credit conditions were much tighter, experienced one of these forms of
financial distress. Axelson et al. (2013) look at a broader sample of transactions and show
that credit market conditions drove leverage in buyouts far more than in publicly listed
firms, where company-level characteristics were much more influential. Kaplan and Schoar
(2005), among others, find that easier credit conditions bring greater inflows into buyout
funds and lower fund-level returns3. In short, the literature suggests that when economic
growth booms and credit spreads narrow, private equity funds attract larger inflows, their
deals involve more leverage and higher valuations, and investors ultimately receive lower
returns.
These empirical patterns suggest to some (e.g., Appelbaum and Batt (2014)) that pri-
vate equity activity is too volatile, too sensitive to credit conditions, and too prone to
leverage, with harmful consequences for the broader economy. In line with this view, a
2013 policy statement by U.S. banking regulators provides guidance on leveraged lending
as follows: “A financial institution should have clear underwriting standards regarding
leveraged transactions as these risks may find their way into a wide variety of invest-
ment instruments and exacerbate systemic risks within the general economy.”4 Similarly,
European Central Bank guidance on leveraged lending states that “Underwriting of trans-
actions presenting high levels of leverage defined as the ratio of Total Debt to EBITDA
3Similarly, Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that large inflows into venture capital funds lead
to substantially higher valuations in venture investments.
4See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending,
March 22, 2013 at www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1303a1.pdf, pages
6-7. EBITDA is Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization.
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exceeding 6.0 times at deal inception should remain exceptional and trigger a referral to
the highest level of credit committee or similar decision-making level.”5 Likewise, Gregory
(2013) argues that buyouts should be monitored for macro-prudential reasons, because
“the increased indebtedness of such companies poses risk to the stability of the financial
system.”
Notwithstanding these concerns and policy initiatives, claims about excessive cyclical-
ity and leverage in PE deals may be overstated, outdated, or misplaced. Large PE buyouts
completed from 2005 to 2008 led to relatively few bankruptcies during or after the global
financial crisis (Primack (2015)). Compared to other similarly leveraged firms, PE-backed
firms were no more likely to default during the financial crisis, and they tended to resolve
financial distress more efficiently (Hotchkiss et al. (2014)). According to practitioner ac-
counts, the ties that PE firms have developed with the banking industry strengthened the
capacity of their portfolio firms to weather financial strains. Close banking ties enabled
PE-backed firms to borrow more cheaply, negotiate more favorable “covenant light” agree-
ments,6 and continue tapping credit during crises (Ivashina and Kovner (2011)). Bernstein
et al. (2018) show that a sample of approximately 400 British PE-backed firms cut invest-
ments less than peers during the global financial crisis and had greater equity and debt
inflows. Moreover, buyout funds established before 2006 earned greater returns than pub-
licly listed equities, while funds established after 2005 experienced returns similar to public
equities (Jenkinson et al. (2016)).
5See Guidance on Leveraged Transactions, ECB Banking Supervision Division, May
2017, at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.leveraged_
transactions_guidance_201705.en.pdf. For a useful comparison of U.S. and Euro-
pean regulatory guidance regarding leveraged lending, see Shearman & Sterling LLP,
Leveraged Lending: Summary of ECB Guidance Compared to US Guidance, June
21, 2017, at www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2017/06/
Leveraged-Lending-Summary-of-the-ECB-Guidance-compared-to-the-US-Guidance-FN-062117.
pdf.
6Covenant light is a type of financing that places fewer restrictions on borrowers.
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As this summary suggests, previous research has considered how the financial character-
istics of and returns to PE investments vary over time. There has been little investigation,
however, into the broader social effects of PE buyouts over the economic cycle. Do the
cyclical patterns in buyout deals carry over to changes in the employment, productivity, and
wage outcomes of portfolio firms? In particular, do deals undertaken when GDP growth is
high, or credit conditions are easy, have fewer beneficial effects (or more harmful effects)
on portfolio firms and their employees? Does a surge of highly leveraged buyout deals set
the stage for a painful crunch if and when the economy contracts and credit conditions
tighten?
To address these questions, we examine non-financial outcomes for roughly 5,100 U.S.
buyouts.7 Using an improved version of the large-sample methodology in Davis et al.
(2014), we explore the extent to which PE buyouts affect employment levels, the pace
of job reallocation, wages, and productivity, all expressed relative to contemporaneous
outcomes at comparable firms not backed by private equity. We focus on how outcomes
unfold at PE buyout targets relative to control units over the first two years after the
buyout. Some of our main findings follow:
• Target firms are more productive than controls before buyouts, and the differential
widens by 9 percentage points over the first two years post buyout. Productivity
gains are concentrated in private-to-private and public-to-private buyouts.
• The pace of job reallocation across facilities rises in target firms relative to controls
post buyout. Much of this increase involves extra merger and acquisition activity.
7Early studies on the real-side firm-level outcomes associated with private equity buyouts include
Kaplan (1989) and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990). More recent work considers much larger samples,
often by exploiting government databases. See Bernstein et al. (2016); Bernstein and Sheen (2016);
Boucly et al. (2011); Cohn et al. (2014, 2017); Davis et al. (2014); Fracassi et al. (2018). Davis
et al. (2014) also summarize several case studies.
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• Employment outcomes vary hugely by type of buyout. In public-to-private deals,
target employment contracts nearly 13% relative to controls over two years. Divi-
sional sales involve job losses of about 11%. Private-to-private and secondary deals
show a strikingly different pattern: target-firm employment expands by 12% and 8%
relative to controls in the first two years after the buyout.8
• Buyouts executed amidst wider credit spreads experience more intra-firm job reallo-
cation and much greater productivity gains.
• Expanding credit spreads and slow GDP growth post buyout bring slower employ-
ment growth for targets relative to controls. For public-to-private deals, they also
bring smaller productivity gains.
• Buyouts bring a small, statistically insignificant drop in average earnings per worker
at target firms relative to controls.
Wage losses are largest in private-to-private buyouts, while wage changes are positive in
divisional sales. These findings point to several broader implications:
1. The social impact of PE buyouts does not lend itself to an easy, simple summary
characterization. The real-side effects of buyouts on target firms differ greatly by
deal type, with external credit conditions, over the economic cycle, and between
existing and greenfield facilities. There are also large differences by industry sector
(Davis et al. (2014)).
2. Our evidence that tighter credit conditions bring greater productivity gains at targets
(relative to controls) suggests a degree of substitution in the levers by which PE
groups create value for their investors. In particular, when debt is more expensive (or
8Secondary deals refer to the acquisition of a portfolio firm from another PE firm.
53
less available), PE groups select buyouts that rely more on operating improvements
to create value for their investors and less on financial engineering.
3. The relative impact of PE buyouts on employment at target firms is pro-cyclical.
Downturns intensify the job losses associated with PE buyouts (relative to controls),
particularly for private-to-private and secondary deals.
4. Our results reinforce concerns about public-to-private deals, which account for 10%
of PE buyouts from 1980 to 2013 and 32% of employment in target firms. Public-to-
private deals exhibit large post-buyout employment losses, a concentration of deals
around market peaks, and poor productivity performance during downturns.
The next section describes the creation of our sample. Section II discusses our empirical
methodology. Section III presents our baseline results on the social effects of PE buyouts,
and Section IV considers how the effects vary with cyclical and credit conditions. Section
V concludes.
2.2 Creating Our Samples of Private Equity Buyouts
2.2.1 Identifying Private Equity Buyouts
Our study builds on the data work and analysis in Davis et al. (2014).9 We consider
later-stage changes in ownership and control, executed and partly financed by PE firms.
In these deals, the (lead) PE firm acquires a controlling equity stake in the target firm
9This effort originated as part of the World Economic Forum effort to assess the long-term effects
of private equity, and also included a study of the demographics of private equity (published as
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009)), growth buyouts in France (Boucly et al. (2011)) the relationship
between private equity and innovation (Lerner et al. (2011)), and management practices and private
equity (Bloom et al. (2015b)).
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and retains significant oversight until it exits by selling its stake. The buyout event typ-
ically involves a shift toward greater leverage in the capital structure of the target firm
and, sometimes, a change in its management. As indicated by our quotations of U.S.
and European regulators above, bank loans are key sources of the credit that facilitates the
leveraged nature of PE buyouts. We made major efforts to construct our sample of buyouts
and ensure its integrity, expending thousands of research assistant hours. Specifically, we
undertook a two-part effort, following Stromberg (2008). The first part drew on the Capi-
talIQ database to create a base sample of PE-sponsored leveraged buyout transactions. We
selected all M&A transactions in CapitalIQ classified as a leveraged buyout, management
buyout, or JV/LBO (joint venture/leverage buyout) and closed between January 1, 1980
and December 31, 2013. To this sample, we added all M&A transactions undertaken by
a financial sponsor classified as investing in buyouts. We excluded management buyouts
not sponsored by a PE firm and startup firms backed by venture capitalists. Although
CapitalIQ has back-filled its database using various sources since starting its data service
in 1999, its coverage remains incomplete in the early years of our sample. For this reason,
the second part of our sample construction efforts relied on other databases,10 the busi-
ness press, and transaction lists for the 1980s compiled by other researchers. The largest
source of discrepancies between our CapitalIQ sample and these lists are pure management
buyouts: LBO transactions not sponsored by a buyout fund or other financial institution
but, instead, undertaken by management itself. Since these management buyouts are not
the object of our study, we exclude them from our sample. Naturally, the overlap between
our CapitalIQ-based sample and lists compiled by other researchers is greater for LBOs
with a financial sponsor. For instance, 62 of the 77 transactions in Kaplan (1989) hand-
selected sample of LBOs completed between 1980 and 1986 are captured by our CapitalIQ
10These include Dealogic, Preqin, and Thomson Reuters.
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sample, a coverage rate of 81%. We added these 15 missing transactions to our sample,
as we did for other PE buyouts identified using various sources beyond CapitalIQ. In the
course of our investigations, we discovered that CapitalIQ classifies certain buyout fund
transactions as private placements rather than acquisitions. In most cases, these private
placements involve minority stakes or follow-on investments and, hence, are unsuitable for
inclusion in our sample. Still, the distinction between buyouts and private placements is
not always clear. In addition, some transactions reported as LBO deals were actually ven-
ture capital investments, which are not the object of our study. We sought to err on the
side of caution by excluding ambiguous transactions and, as a result, may miss some bona
fide LBOs. We also excluded acquisitions that were announced but not yet completed by
the end of 2013, acquisitions of non-control stakes (typically associated with growth and
venture transactions, not classic buyouts), purchases of firms with foreign headquarters,
stakes in public companies that remained publicly traded (PIPES), and other misclassified
transactions. We identified these transactions through the careful review of text fields in
CapitalIQ records and our own detailed research using other commercial databases, secu-
rities filings, and media accounts. The resulting sample contains 9,794 PE-led leveraged
buyouts of U.S. companies from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 2013.11 We sort the
sample transactions into four main deal types: the buyout of an independent, privately
11Ayash and Rastad (2017) criticize our approach to distinguishing LBOs from growth equity
buyouts, because data service providers have difficulty differentiating between leverage buyouts
and growth equity buyouts. They advocate a transaction value cutoff approach, based on the idea
that smaller deals are more likely to be growth equity buyouts. The cutoff approach yields two
types of errors: (a) in deals larger than the cutoff, the improper inclusion of all growth equity
buyouts, and (b) in deals smaller than the cutoff, the improper exclusion of all leveraged buyouts.
While some early papers in the PE literature used size cut-offs, they did so due to a lack of data on
smaller transactions (e.g., Kaplan (1989), footnote 3). Most major papers in the recent literature
on PE rely on classification methodologies resembling ours to a greater or lesser extent. Examples
include Axelson et al. (2013); Faccio and HSU (2017); Fang et al. (2013); Ivashina and Kovner
(2011).
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held firm (private-to-private); the buyout of a publicly listed firm (public-to-private); the
buyout of part of a firm (divisional); and the buyout of a portfolio firm from another PE
firm (secondary). We derive our classifications from the textual descriptions of the trans-
actions in CapitalIQ, as well as our own reviews of other databases, press accounts, and
securities filings.
2.2.2 Inspecting the Full Sample (Before Linking to Census Data)
Figure 2.1 displays quarterly counts of PE-sponsored buyouts in our sample for these
four deal types.12 As noted in earlier studies, PE buyout activity grew enormously in
recent decades. The expansion is especially striking for private-to-private buyouts, which
saw a huge increase in deal flow over time. The flow of new PE buyouts crashed in 2008 as
the financial crisis gathered force, credit conditions tightened, and the economy contracted.
Interestingly, the flow of new public-to-private buyouts dropped off well before the onset of
the financial crisis, and remained at modest levels through the end of our sample. Counts for
private-to-private deals and secondary sales rebounded sharply as the economy recovered
from the 2008-09 recession and maintained a robust pace until the end of our sample in
2013. To set the stage for the analysis below, Table 2.1 presents evidence on how deal
flow relates to economic and credit conditions. We regress the natural log of the quarterly
buyout count on deal-type indicators interacted with market conditions at the buyout
close (top panel) and over the next two years (bottom panel). We use real GDP growth
to characterize economic conditions and the yield spread between below-investment-grade
corporate bonds and one-month LIBOR for credit conditions.13 Both regressions include
12Because we lack non-Census data on deal size for much of our sample, especially in more recent
years, we cannot construct a size-weighted version of Figure 2.1 without matching to Census micro
data. Once we match, however, we become subject to Census disclosure rules that preclude a
granular depiction of deal flow as in Figure 1. The same point applies to Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below.
13See Section IV for the precise definition of these measures.
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controls for deal type and a linear time trend. The results are striking. The top panel
says that deal volumes are higher when real GDP growth is above its sample median and
credit spreads are narrower than the median. Buyout counts are 28 log points (32%) higher
for private-to-private deals, 66 log points (93%) higher for public-to-private deals, and 41
(51%) log points higher for divisional sales in periods with above-average GDP growth,
conditional on the credit-spread interaction variables and the controls. Buyout counts
are 18-26 log points lower when credit spreads are wider than average, conditional on the
other regressors. Axelson et al. (2013), among others, also document the relationship of
credit spreads to buyout activity and to the extent of leverage and valuations. The bottom
panel in Table 2.1 says that periods with high buyout volume are associated with rising
credit spreads over the next two years and, except for secondary sales, higher than average
GDP growth over the next two years. Again, the associations are large in magnitude.
For example, buyout counts are 20-68 log points higher in periods that precede above-
average increases in credit spreads. This result says that target firms are more likely
than not to face a tightening of credit conditions post buyout, an issue that we explore
below. Table 2.2 shows how the industry mix of PE buyouts differs by deal type. For
instance, public-to-private deals are relatively prevalent in Consumer Staples (e.g., food
and household products) and Healthcare, while divisional deals are relatively prevalent
in Information Technology and in Utilities. A Pearson chi-squared test rejects the null
hypothesis that the industry distribution of buyouts is independent of deal type. The
distributions of PE buyouts by industry, firm size, and firm age also differ greatly from the
corresponding distributions of private sector employment, as shown in Davis et al. (2014).
Given the patterns in Tables 1 and 2 and our earlier work, our econometric investigations
below compare buyout targets to control units defined by buyout period, industry, firm
size, and firm age.
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2.2.3 Matching Private Equity Buyouts to Census Micro Data
The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) is a longitudinal version of the Census
Bureaus comprehensive Business Register (BR), which contains annual data on U.S. busi-
nesses with paid employees. The LBD covers the entire nonfarm private sector and, in
recent years, has roughly 7 million establishment records and 5 million firm records per
year.14 It draws on a wide range of administrative records and survey sources for data
inputs. Firms are defined based on operational control, and all establishments majority
owned by a parent firm are included in the parents activity measures. Core data items
include employment, payroll, four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) or six-digit
North American Industrial Classification (NAICS), employer identification numbers, busi-
ness names, and location information. To merge our data on buyouts to Census data on
firms and establishments, we match business name and address information for the buyout
targets to the name and address records in the BR. The Online Appendix describes our
matching process in detail. The process yields a mapping to one or more firms in the BR for
about 7,600 of the 9,794 U.S. buyouts that we identified from CapitalIQ and other sources.
Of these 7,600 buyouts, about 4,100 match to BR identifiers for a single firm, while the
other 3,500 map to identifiers for multiple firms. We resolved about 2,000 of these 3,500
cases to a unique match, leaving about 6,000 buyouts that we confidently match to a unique
firm in the BR in the period from 1980 to 2013. The main reason we cannot confidently
resolve the other 1,500 cases to a unique firm in the BR is because many targets undergo
a complex reorganization during the buyout, or shortly thereafter. The reorganization can
involve the sale of multiple firm components to multiple parties, the emergence of multiple
new firm IDs, and the introduction of a complex array of holding company structures.
14An establishment is a physical location where economic activity occurs. A firm is a legal entity
that owns and operates one or more establishments.
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These cases present considerable matching challenges. There are other challenges as well,
as discussed in the Online Appendix. Rather than include matches of dubious quality,
we exclude them from our analysis. Once matched to the BR, we can identify all estab-
lishments owned by the target firm as of its buyout year. LBD longitudinal links let us
compute employment changes for establishments and firms and track their entry, exit, and
ownership changes. We supplement the LBD with firm-level revenue data drawn from the
Census BR to obtain a revenue-enhanced version of the LBD (RE-LBD). The revenue data,
available from 1996 to 2013, let us study the impact of PE buyouts on labor productivity,
defined as real revenue per worker. About 20 percent of LBD firm-year observations cannot
be matched to BR revenue data because firms can report income under EINs that may fall
outside the set of EINs that Census considers part of that firm for employment purposes.
Haltiwanger et al. (2017) provide additional information about the revenue data.
2.2.4 Treatment of Timing Matters
Given our interest in employment dynamics, the relationship of the LBD employment
measure to the timing of PE buyouts requires careful treatment. The LBD reports total
employment in the payroll period containing the week of March 12. Accordingly, for
buyouts that close before October 1, LBD employment in March of the same calendar
year serves as our contemporaneous employment measure. We assign transactions that
close on or after October 1 in calendar year t to the LBD employment value in March
of t + 1. October is the natural cutoff because it lies midway between March-to-March
employment changes in the LBD.15 Henceforth, our references to buyout activity in year t
15Fractional-year mistiming of buyout deals is unavoidable when matching to the LBD, given
its annual frequency. When buyouts are uniformly distributed over the year, an October cutoff
minimizes the mean absolute mistiming gap. See Davis et al. (2018) for additional discussion. As
an empirical matter, buyout transaction dates are distributed fairly evenly over the calendar year.
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refer to deals that closed from October of calendar year t−1 through September of calendar
year t. In particular, buyouts that closed in October, November or December of 2013 are
shifted forward to 2014, beyond the time span covered by our LBD data. As a result, these
matched targets are not part of our analysis sample. All told, we are left with about 6,000
matched target firms acquired in PE buyouts from 1980 to 2013. These firms operated
about 177,000 establishments as of the buyout year and had nearly 7 million workers on
their payrolls as of March in the buyout year.
2.2.5 Tracking Firms after the Buyout and Forming Our Analysis Sample
Of necessity, much of our analysis restricts attention to target firms that we can track
after the buyout. While we can readily track establishments over time in the LBD, tracking
firms is more challenging for two main reasons: the disappearance of firm identifiers (IDs),
and irregularities in Census Bureau tracking of PE targets involved in certain divisional
sales. We elaborate on these two reasons in turn.
Firm ID Disappearance The disappearance of a firm ID in the LBD can occur for var-
ious reasons. One is the death of a firm and the closure of all of its establishments.
Firm death in this sense presents no problem: we capture such events whether they
involve target or control firms. A more difficult situation involves a target firm ID
in the buyout year that disappears in later years, even though some of the establish-
ments owned by the firm (as of the buyout year) continue to operate. This situation
can arise when the various components of the original firm are acquired by multiple
existing firms. It is inherently difficult to define and measure firm changes when the
original legal entity ceases to exist, and we exclude these cases from our firm-level
longitudinal analyses.16 To reduce the number of observations lost for this reason
16Even establishments are challenging to track in some circumstances. Every five years, the
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and other challenges in tracking firms over time, we restrict our longitudinal analyses
to the buyout year and the next two years.
Divisional Transactions . In principle, the Annual Company Organization Survey lets
Census accurately track the business units involved in divisional sales. However, we
discovered divisional sales in which the firm ID of the (new) target firm remained the
same as the firm ID of the selling firm. This situation indicates that the new firm cre-
ated in the course of the divisional buyout did not receive a new firm ID, at least not
in a timely manner. This problem does not preclude an establishment-level analysis,
because we can often use an alternative identifier the Employer Identification Num-
ber (EIN) to accurately identify, as of the buyout year, the establishments involved
in divisional sales. Unfortunately, EINs are unsuitable for tracking firms through
time, because new and acquired establishments may obtain new EINs. Thus, we
exclude divisional buyouts from our firm-level longitudinal analyses when the LBD
lacks an accurate firm ID for the newly created target firm. Table2.3 summarizes our
sample of PE buyouts matched to Census micro data. Panel A reports the number
of establishments operated by our 6,000 matched target firms and their employment,
with breakdowns by deal type. Panel B considers the 5,100 matched buyouts that
closed from 1980 to 2011. Compared to the 1980-2003 sample in Davis et al. (2014),
our new 1980-2011 analysis sample has 2.3 times as many matched targets, reflect-
Census Bureau obtains a full list of establishments owned by multi-unit firms from the Economic
Censuses. It also obtains a full list of establishments owned by large multi-unit firms (250 or more
employees before 2013) from the Annual Company Organization Survey (COS). However, the COS
samples smaller multi-unit firms in a targeted manner based on information that they underwent
rapid growth or organizational change. Thus, Census may not promptly recognize the ownership of
establishments operated by small, multi-unit firms in intercensal years. To address this matter, the
LBD retimes the intercensal entry and exit of some establishments operated by small multi-unit
firms. Still, the timing of M&A activity for small multi-units not covered by the COS or other
Census surveys exhibits some bunching in Economic Census years.
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ing high deal flow after 2003. Private-to-private deals account for about half of our
1980-2011 sample, as in our earlier work. But the 22% share of secondary sales is
nearly twice as large as in our earlier work, reflecting a large flow of these deals in
recent years. The share of divisional buyouts is somewhat smaller in our new sam-
ple. These compositional changes over time can also be seen in Figure 2.1. Panel C
compares matched buyouts in our new sample to those in Davis et al. (2014) for the
overlapping period from 1980 to 2003. Our new sample has about 20% fewer buyouts
in the overlapping period, which reflects the more rigorous matching criteria that we
now apply. Our new sample of two-year continuer targets, excluding EIN cases, has
only 10% fewer matched buyouts. The mix of buyout types in our new 1980-2003
sample is similar to that in our earlier work, but our new sample has considerably
fewer establishments and less employment.
2.3 Empirical Methods and Identification Assumptions
This section describes several important aspects of our empirical methods. The first
relates to how we track business outcomes over time. While we focus on firm-level out-
comes, we exploit the establishment-level data in the LBD in several ways: to distinguish
organic changes at the firm level from acquisitions and divestitures, to capture new facili-
ties opened post buyout, and to decompose firm-level employment changes into the gross
job creation and destruction components associated with growing and shrinking establish-
ments, respectively. The LBDs capacity to isolate each of these adjustment margins is one
of its major strengths.
A second aspect relates to aggregation and the measurement of growth rates. Let Eit
denote employment at establishment or firm i in year t i.e., the number of workers on
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payroll in the pay period covering March 12. We measure the employment growth rate of
unit i from t − k to t as git,t−k = (Eit − Ei,t−k)/Xit,t−k, whereXit,t−k = 0.5(Eit + Ei,t−k).
This growth rate measure is symmetric about zero and lies in the interval [-2, 2], with
endpoints corresponding to death and birth.17 Employment growth at higher levels of ag-
gregation is then given by gt,t−k =
∑
i(X(it, t− k/Xt,t−k)git,t−k, where Xt,t−k =
∑
iXit,t−k
. Using these formulas, we can easily and consistently aggregate from establishments to
firms, from individual units to industries, and over time periods. This approach to growth
rates and aggregation also works for gross job creation and destruction, job reallocation,
and employment changes on particular margins such as acquisitions and divestitures or
continuing establishments.
A third aspect relates to the selection of control units for comparison to buyout targets
in our regression models. We need suitable control units because the distribution of pri-
vate equity buyouts across industries and business characteristics is not random. Target
firms are larger and older than the average firm and disproportionately concentrated in
manufacturing, information technology, accommodations, and food services (Davis et al.,
2014). They also differ by deal type, as shown above. Moreover, growth and volatility
vary greatly by firm size and age, and the workplace and production process differ greatly
by industry.18 In view of these facts, we sort target firms into cells defined by industry,
size, age, multi-unit status, and buyout year. We then identify all firms not backed by
private equity that fall into the same cell as the given target firm(s), and treat those firms
as control units for the target firm(s) in that cell. Specifically, we define our control cells as
17This growth rate measure has become standard in analyses of establishment and firm dynamics,
because it shares some useful properties of log differences while also handling entry and exit. See
Davis et al. (1998) and Tornqvist et al. (1985).
18Much previous research highlights sharp differences in employment growth and the pace of job
reallocation by firm size, firm age and industry. See, for example, Davis et al. (1998); Haltiwanger
et al. (2013).
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the full cross product of about 90 industries (3-digit NAICS), 10 firm size categories, 6 firm
age categories, a dummy for firms with multiple establishments, and 32 distinct buyout
years from 1980 to 2011.19 This classification yields over 10,000 control cells per year.
Of course, many cells are unpopulated, but the flexibility and richness of our approach to
control units is clear.
Fourth, we estimate the effects of buyouts using a difference-in-difference approach.
That is, we compare changes in jobs, wages, and productivity at target firms in the wake
of buyouts to contemporaneous changes at their matched control units.20 This approach, in
combination with our rich set of controls, facilitates an apples-to-apples comparison when
estimating the effects of buyouts.
A fifth aspect pertains to how we weight observations in the estimation. In this regard,
we are mindful that buyout effects can vary with firm characteristics and economic condi-
tions and by industry, deal type, and time period. Indeed, we find material differences in
the effects of buyouts on some of these dimensions, as discussed below. However, there is
surely more heterogeneity in treatment effects than we can estimate with precision. Faced
with this heterogeneity, our goal is to obtain a consistent estimate for the activity-weighted
mean treatment effect on treated units under two common identification assumptions in
regression studies of treatment effects:
CMI (conditional mean independence) Conditional on controls and the treatment
19We define industry for multi-unit firms based on the modal industry of their establishments,
computed on an employment-weighted basis. Our firm size categories are 1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49,
50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, 1000-2499, 2500-4999, 5000-9999, and 10000 or more employees.
Our firm age categories are 0-5 years, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, and 21 or more years. Following Davis
et al. (2014), when a firm first appears in the LBD, we assign it the age of its oldest establishment.
We then increment the firms age by one year for each year it continues as a legal entity in the LBD.
In this way, we avoid arbitrary increases or decreases in firm age due to the sale and purchase of
establishments.
20In Davis et al. (2014), we find that propensity score matching estimators yield very similar
results. We stick with the control cell approach in this paper for simplicity.
65
indicator, outcomes for treated and non-treated units are independently distributed
within cells.
SUTVA (stable unit treatment value) Treating one unit has no effect on the out-
comes of other units.21
To achieve our estimation goal, we adopt two principles in weighting the observations:22
TS (target-share weighting) Weight each target (and each target cell) by its share of
aggregate target activity, where aggregate refers to the sum over all buyouts in the
regression sample.
SCT (set control weights to targets) Set the sum of weights on controls in a given
cell to the cells target activity share.
To be precise, suppose we have two target firms in two separate control cells, and we are
interested in target-control comparisons from t to t + k. The targets have activity levels
X(1,t+k,t) = 0.5(E(1,t+k) + E1t) and X(2,t+k,t) = 0.5(E(2,t+k) + E2t). The first targets share
of aggregate target activity is ω(1,t+k,t) ≡ X(1,t+k,t)/(X(1,t+k,t) +X(2,t+k,t)), and the seconds
share is ω(2,t+k,t) ≡ X(2,t+k,t)/(X(1,t+k,t) + X(2,t+k,t)). Since each control cell has a single





j ω(j,t+k,t) = ω(2,t+k,t), where C indexes control cells, and j indexes
control units in the cell.
21See Chapter 18 in Wooldridge (2002) for an extended discussion of CMI and SUTVA in panel
regression studies of treatment effects.
22Neither equal weighting nor simple activity weighting of regression observations recovers the
average treatment effect of interest.
23Note that we define a units activity level as the average of its employment at the start and
end of the time interval under consideration. This practice conforms to our overall approach to
aggregation and growth rate measurement, as discussed above in the main text.
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Principle TS helps recover an average treatment effect that reflects the distribution
over cells of target activity levels. Principle SCT has a similar motivation. It also ensures
that the influence of control units on the coefficient estimates for covariates reflects the
distribution over cells of target activity levels. Principle SCT is silent on exactly how to
set control unit weights within cells, so long as they sum to the cells share of aggregate
target employment. In practice, we weight each control unit in proportion to its share of
employment among the control units in the cell. After obtaining these proportions, we
rescale then to satisfy SCT. We experimented with other approaches to weighting control
units that comply with SCT. In particular, we tried equal weights for all control units
within a given cell. We also tried winsorizing the weights of very large control units before
rescaling to comply with SCT.24 These alternative approaches to weighting control units
led to results similar to the ones reported below.
Recall that we aim to recover the average treatment effect on the treated (buyout)
firms under CMI and SUTVA. A standard approach is to fit a regression model with
heterogeneous treatment effects, average over the treatment effect estimates, and compute
the standard error for the average treatment effect by the delta method. (See, e.g., Chapter
18 in Wooldridge (2002).) That is the approach we took in Davis et al. (2014). Weighting
principles TS and SCT afford a simpler econometric approach that recovers the average
24Three concerns motivated our experimentation with alternative schemes that give less weight
to larger control units, while still adhering to principle SCT. First, very large employment values
for certain control units could reflect measurement error. This concern might apply to targets
as well, but since our sample has only a few thousand targets, we scrutinize them carefully. We
believe we have identified (and corrected) gross errors in target outcomes. A similarly careful
approach for controls is infeasible, since there are so many of them. Second, it is often hard to
fit very large firms into a particular industry category, even at the three-digit NAICS level. The
classification challenges presented by such large firms raise concerns about the suitability of the
treatment-control comparison. Third, the very largest control firms can be much larger than the
corresponding target firm. The vast difference in size raises a different source of concern about the
suitability of the treatment-control comparison. By applying equal weights to control units in a
given cell or winsorizing the weights, we mitigate these concerns.
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treatment effect of interest from a specification with a homogenous treatment effect. Under
this simpler approach, we need not resort to the delta method to obtain standard errors.
We can instead obtain them directly from the standard output for weighted least squares
regressions in STATA and other widely used statistical packages. That is the approach we
take here.
2.4 Analysis of Social Impact
2.4.1 The Regression Specification and Additional Remarks about Iden-
tification
Our firm-level regression analysis considers the same type of semi-parametric specifi-
cations as our earlier paper. To be precise, we estimate specifications of the following form




Dcitθc + λ1LESTit + λ2FIRMit + γPEit + εit,
where Y(i,t+2) is the change in the outcome variable of interest from buyout year t to
two years later for firm i. The Dcit are cell-level dummy variables defined on the full cross
product of buyout year t, the firms three-digit NAICS, its size category, its age category,
and an indicator for whether it has one or multiple establishments. LESTit and FIRMit
are controls for the firms pre-buyout growth history. To construct LESTit, we consider
the set of establishments owned by firm i in buyout year t and compute their employment
growth rate from t − 3 to t − 1. To construct FIRMit, we consider the parent firm that
owned these establishments in t − 3 and compute its growth rate from t − 3 to t − 1.
If ownership was split across multiple firms in t − 3, we select the firm with the largest
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share of employment among these establishments. Often, but not always, these two control
variables take on the same value.
PEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 for a target firm. Per our discussion of weighting
in Section 2.3, the coefficient γ recovers a consistent estimate of the weighted average
treatment effect on treated units (i.e., buyout targets) under assumptions CMI and SUTVA.
Our rich set of controls lends greater plausibility to the CMI assumption than in most
previous work on PE buyouts. Even if CMI fails, our results throw light on the economic
role of private equity, and provide useful evidence for formulating and evaluating theoretical
models of PE behavior and its effects. The SUTVA assumption could fail if treatment
effects on targets systematically alter market equilibrium outcomes for controls through
demand and supply channels or by competitive pressures that stimulate productivity gains
at controls. Since buyout targets account for modest activity levels compared to controls,
standard market equilibrium effects are unlikely to be important in our setting, especially
within our two-year post-buyout time frame.
2.4.2 Average Treatment Effects Over All Buyouts
Table 2.4 presents our first set of regression results. The sample contains firms that
underwent buyouts from 1980 to 2011 and matched control firms in the same cells. The top
row in Panel A says that employment at target firms shrinks by a statistically insignificant
1.4 percentage points relative to control units in the two years after the buyout. The second
row says that target-firm employment shrinks by a statistically significant 4.4 points relative
to controls when omitting post-buyout acquisitions and divestitures. These bottom line
effects of PE buyouts on target firm employment are moderately larger than we found in
Davis et al. (2014): -0.9 percentage points overall, and -3.7 points for organic growth.
The other rows in Panel A break down the overall employment change into several
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margins of adjustment. Continuers refer to establishments that operate under ownership
of the same firm (target or control) throughout the period from t to t+ 2. Continuer em-
ployment at target firms shrinks by (a statistically insignificant) 1.5% relative to control
counterparts in the two years after buyout. The rate of employment change at growing
continuers is essentially identical for buyouts and controls, as indicated by the Creation
results. In contrast, contracting continuers shrink more rapidly, as indicated by the De-
struction results. Target firms experience 4.0% larger employment losses from shuttered
establishments (Deaths) and 1.2% greater employment gains due to new facilities (Births).
They also add 3.7% more jobs through acquisitions.
Because the regressions are employment weighted, we can sum the coefficients over
the margins. Consider first the results for “Continuers” and “Deaths” which capture all
employment changes for establishments owned and operated by targets and controls in
the buyout year. Summing these two components yields a two-year employment growth
rate differential of -5.6 percentage points (-1.53 4.03) for targets. That is, establishments
operated by target firms as of the buyout year shed 5.6% of employment relative to controls
over the next two years, largely through establishment shutdowns. Factoring in the greater
propensity of target firms to create more new jobs at new establishments adds 1.2 points
to this sum. That yields a net differential of -4.4 percentage points for targets, the same as
the organic growth change in the second row. Further factoring in the role of acquisitions
and divestitures adds 3.0 points, yielding an overall buyout effect on firm-level employment
of -1.4 percentage points over two years.
Panel A also provides evidence that buyouts raise job reallocation. Compared to con-
trols, target firms exhibit greater job destruction through establishment shutdowns, more
job creation through establishment births, more employment losses through divestitures,
and greater employment gains through acquisitions. In short, targets undergo a faster pace
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of job reallocation after buyouts than controls. We delve more deeply into the reallocation
effects of buyouts shortly.
How buyouts affect wages has long been controversial. Critics argue that buyouts lead
to lower wages, as formalized by Shleifer and Summers (1988). Indeed, Lichtenberg and
Siegel (1990) find that buyouts lead to lower compensation for white-collar workers. More
recently, Agrawal and Tambe (2016) suggest that buyouts can enhance human capital in
target firms, particularly by developing employee knowledge of information technology.
Survey evidence in Gompers et al. (2016) is consistent with this view.
Panel B in Table 2.4 provides new evidence on the wage effects of PE buyouts using
a much larger sample than previous studies. Our wage measure is the firms gross annual
compensation per employee.25 We consider the same sample as before, except for dropping
firms that close all establishments by t+2, because we cannot calculate wage changes for
firms that die. (There are very few such firms among targets.) The first row in Panel B
reports a modest, statistically insignificant wage drop of -0.3% at target firms relative to
controls over two years post buyout. The next two rows in Panel B show that target firms
pay a wage premium of about 3% in the buyout year and two years later. Thus, we find
no evidence that PE buyouts have systematic effects on wages at least when aggregating
25Barth et al. (2014) provide a detailed description of the LBD wage measure: The data follow
the definition of salaries and wages used for calculating the federal withholding tax. They report the
gross earnings paid in the calendar year to employees at the establishment prior to such deductions as
employees social security contributions, withholding taxes, group insurance premiums, union dues,
and savings bonds. Included in gross earnings are all forms of compensation such as salaries, wages,
commissions, dismissal pay, paid bonuses, vacation and sick leave pay, and the cash equivalent of
compensation paid in kind. Salaries of officers of the establishment, if a corporation, are included.
Payments to proprietors or partners, if an unincorporated concern, are excluded. Salaries and wages
do not include supplementary labor costs such as employers Social Security contributions and other
legally required expenditures or payments for voluntary programs. Thus, our wage measure includes
management compensation except for stock option grants, which are typically constructed to defer
tax obligation until exercise or sale. Buyouts often tilt the compensation of senior management
toward stock options (Leslie and Oyer , 2008), which means we may slightly understate the true
wage change at target firms.
71
over deal types and time periods.
Panel C reports results for firm-level revenue productivity, measured as the log of Real
Revenue per Worker using the industry-level price deflators described in Haltiwanger et al.
(2017). As noted above, the revenue productivity data are available for about 80 percent
of the firm-level observations from 1996 onwards. To address the potential selection bias
introduced by missing productivity observations, we construct inverse propensity score
weights for the observations as in Haltiwanger et al. (2017). These weights ensure that the
re-weighted RE-LBD is representative of the LBD universe with respect to the size, age,
employment growth rate, industry sector, and multi-unit status of firms. We apply these
weights in the regression analysis of productivity growth in addition to the activity weights
described in Section 2.3.
The second row of Panel C says that target firms are 35 log points more productive
than control firms as of the buyout year, a very large gap. The gap widens by 9 log points
over the next two years after the buyout, according to the productivity change regression
reported in the top row of Panel C, and by 6 log points when comparing the productivity
level regression in t + 2 to the one in t.26 Our earlier work in Davis et al. (2014) finds
that PE buyouts lead to smaller TFP gains at target firms relative to controls in the
manufacturing sector. Here, we find a larger effect of PE buyouts on labor productivity
when looking across all industry sectors.27
Table 2.5 reports the estimated impact of PE buyouts on two measures of reallocation
activity. The overall job reallocation rate for a firm is the sum of its gross job gains due
26Our propensity score weights that adjust for the missing productivity observations differ across
the three regressions in Panel C. That is why the level and change regressions yield somewhat
different estimates for the effect of buyouts on productivity.
27Foster et al. (2006) show that gross output per worker and TFP are highly correlated within
industries, presumably because materials and capital shares are similar across firms within in-
dustries. Because our control variables include industry-by-year effects, we effectively perform
within-industry comparisons in our productivity growth regressions.
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to new, expanding, and acquired establishments and its gross job losses due to exiting,
shrinking, and divested establishments. A firms excess reallocation rate is the difference
between its job reallocation rate and the absolute value of its net growth rate.28 If a
firm changes employment in the same direction at all of its establishments, then its excess
reallocation is zero. To the extent that a firm expands employment at some units and
contracts employment at others, it has positive excess reallocation. If the firm adds jobs
at some of its establishments and cuts an equal number of jobs at other establishments,
then excess reallocation equals overall job reallocation.
According to Table 2.5, the overall job reallocation rate is 7.1 percentage points higher
at targets for organic employment changes over the two years after the buyout and 11.5
points higher when including acquisitions and divestitures, both highly significant. These
results confirm our previous inference that PE buyouts accelerate the pace of reallocation at
target firms, more so when including acquisitions and divestitures. The excess reallocation
rate is 5.0 percentage points higher at target firms for all changes, but (insignificantly) lower
for organic changes. The implication is that the faster pace of job reallocation induced by
buyouts mainly involves greater reallocation of across firms rather than within target firms.
That is, PE buyouts lead to net job losses at some target firms (relative to control units)
and net job gains at other target firms. The extra between-firm reallocation of jobs induced
by PE buyouts equals 6.5 (11.5 - 5.0) percent of initial employment over the first two years
after the buyout.
28This concept of excess reallocation is often used in the literature on gross job flows to analyze
the nature of job reallocation within and between industries or sectors. Examples include Dunne
et al. (1989) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999). Our approach here applies the concept to
the reallocation of jobs across units within firms.
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2.4.3 Treatment Effects by Buyout Type
There are sound reasons to expect the social impacts of PE buyouts to vary by deal
type. Public-to-private deals involve target firms with highly dispersed ownership. These
firms may suffer from poor corporate governance and face a strong need for cost cutting.
Buyouts of privately held firms may be more often motivated by a desire to professionalize
management or gain better access to financing. Some divisional sales involve units that fit
poorly with the pre-buyout parent firm. In other divisional sales, the parent firm recognizes
a need for downsizing but outsources that unpleasant task to new PE owners in an effort
to shield its public image and employee morale in the rest of the firm. Some secondary
sales reflect an incomplete effort by the initial PE owner to improve the operations and
profitability of the target firm, often truncated by the desire to have a successful exit prior
to raising a new fund.
In light of these observations, Table 2.6 reports regression results by deal type. The
outcome variables and specifications parallel the ones in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. As seen in
the top row of Panel A, the employment effects of PE buyouts differ dramatically by deal
type. Target employment contracts nearly 13 percent relative to controls over two years
post buyout in public-to-private deals. This result, along with the high visibility and large
employment share (31% of target employment from 1980 to 2013) of public-to private deals,
helps explain concerns about job losses in PE buyouts. Divisional sales also involve large
job losses relative to controls about 11 percent over two years. The similarities between
public-to-private and divisional deals are perhaps unsurprising, given that both typically
involve sellers who are publicly traded entities. In sharp contrast, target employment jumps
by 13% relative to controls in private-to-private deals (26% of target employment) and by
10% in secondary deals (19%). Buyout effects also differ sharply for organic changes: -10%
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and -16% for public-to-private and divisional deals versus +4% and +6% for private-to-
private and secondary deals.
Turning to Panel B, buyouts bring large upticks in overall job reallocation for all deal
types, with magnitudes ranging from 9% of buyout-year employment in secondary sales to
19% in divisional sales. However, the character of the extra buyout-induced reallocation
differs among deal types. Job losses in public-to-private and divisional deals largely re-
flect establishment closures and, for divisional deals, job cuts in continuing establishments.
Buyout-induced job gains in private-to-private and secondary deals reflect the important
roles of acquisitions and establishment births and, for secondary sales, a boost in job cre-
ation at continuers. For public-to-private deals, essentially all of the extra job reallocation
reflects a downsizing of some target firms (relative to controls) and an upsizing of others.
In other words, targets show virtually no uptick in excess reallocation in public-to-private
deals. In contrast, an uptick in excess reallocation at target firms accounts for one-half
to two-thirds of the extra buyout-induced job reallocation in the other deal types. For
divisional sales, most of the extra excess job reallocation occurs on organic margins.
Panel C focuses on wage differences and effects associated with PE buyouts. At the
time of buyouts, employees in public-to-private and divisional targets receive sizable wage
premia relative to their counterparts in control firms, while employees in secondary targets
receive a discount. More noteworthy for our purposes, earnings per worker rise by 11%
in divisional targets relative to controls over two years post buyout, while falling by 6%
in private-to-private deals. We find smaller, statistically insignificant wage declines for
public-to-private and secondary deals.
Large post-buyout wage gains at divisional targets may partly reflect what practitioners
call job title upgrading: When a corporate division becomes a new stand-alone firm, the
divisional general manager (or his replacement) becomes CEO, the divisional controller
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becomes CFO, and so on. The new titles and firm-wide responsibilities often come with
(much) higher pay. The Carlyle Groups divisional buyout of DuPont Performance Coatings
(renamed Axalta Coating Systems) in February 2013 offers a case in point.29
Panel D considers productivity changes. Again, we find large differences in buyout
effects by deal type. Target firms in private-to-private deals experience a gain in revenue per
worker of 14 log points over two years post buyout relative to control counterparts. Targets
in public-to-private deals enjoy even larger gains, but the imprecise estimate precludes a
strong inference.
In summary, Table 2.6 says the social impacts of PE buyouts vary greatly by deal
type, as anticipated. The pattern of results is broadly consistent with the limited body
of evidence compiled in previous research on the real-side effects of PE buyouts. (The
literature on private equity is voluminous but mainly speaks to financial characteristics
and outcomes.)
Private-to-private deals exhibit high post-buyout employment growth (largely but not
entirely due to acquisitions), wage reductions, and large productivity gains. These
results align with the view that private equity eases financing constraints at target
firms, enabling their expansion (Boucly et al., 2011). The large productivity gains
align with evidence in Bloom et al. (2015b) that PE buyouts bring better management
practices. Their sample contains buyouts of middle-market firms for which private-
29The top five personnel of Axalta received compensation in 2013 of $17.2 million, including
the aggregate fair value of stock option awards as of the grant date. While the reporting of the
value of the option grants may differ for tax purposes (and hence in our data), even the total
non-option compensation of the five individuals was $6.1 million. We cannot directly observe the
compensation of the top five employees of DuPont Performance Coatings in 2012, but web sites
such as Glassdoor suggest that senior divisional managers at DuPont received contemporaneous
compensation packages in the mid-six figures. See Axalta Coating Systems, Schedule 14A, March
23, 2015 and Lerner and Tuzikov (2018). Thus, the compensation of top Axalta personnel in 2013
was much greater than what they, or their counterparts, likely earned as senior divisional managers
before the buyout.
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to-private deals are likely to predominate.
Public-to-private deals exhibit large job losses, often through facility closures, and large
(imprecisely estimated) productivity gains. The large job losses in these deals (and in
divisional sales) may partly reflect the workforce recontracting hypothesis of Shleifer
and Summers (1988). They may also partly reflect a concentration of these deals in
advance of credit-market tightening, a topic we consider in the next section.
Divisional deals also involve large job losses, through both facility closures and cutbacks
at continuers, but large gains in compensation per worker.
Secondary deals exhibit high target employment growth, largely organic, and few dis-
cernable effects otherwise. This pattern resonates with Degeorge et al. (2016), who
find positive financial performance in secondary deals. It is reasonable to hypothe-
size in many cases, that the previous PE owner undertook considerable restructuring,
setting the stage for rapid employment growth after the secondary buyout.
2.5 How the Impact of Buyouts Varies with Market Condi-
tions
We now investigate how the social impact of PE buyouts varies with market conditions.




Dcitθc + λ1ESTit + λ2FIRMit + γPEit + βPEit ∗MktConditiont + εit,
where the new term, βPEitMktConditiont, captures the interaction between buyout status
and market conditions. When using intra-year variation in market conditions, we also
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include the MktConditiont main effect. When using only annual variation, we cannot
separately identify the main effect since our cell-level controls encompass annual time
effects.
Table 2.7 considers two measures of market conditions when the buyout closed: the
log change in real GDP over the four-quarter interval ending in the quarter of the buyout
closing (using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data) and the spread in the buyout
month between the yield to maturity in the Bank of America Merrill Lynch U.S. High
Yield Index for corporate bonds and the one-month LIBOR. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 instead
consider how market conditions evolve after the close. We measure post-buyout changes
in market conditions from March (or the first quarter) of year t to March (first quarter) of
year t + 2.30 In short, Table 2.7 tells us how targets fare post buyout (relative to control
firms) as a function of market conditions near the deal close, while Tables 2.8 and 2.9 tell
us how targets fare as a function of the evolution in market conditions after the buyout.
Turning first to the Table 2.7 results, we find no evidence that the post-buyout per-
formance of target firms (again, relative to controls) varies with GDP growth in the four
quarters leading up to the buyout close. The β coefficients on the interaction term are
imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant for each dependent variable in columns
(1) to (5). In contrast, higher credit spreads at the close are associated with large, sta-
tistically significant post-buyout increases in excess reallocation and productivity growth
at target firms. These increases come on top of the baseline effects seen in the top row.
The last row in Table 2.7 reports the product of the β coefficient and a unit standard de-
viation change in market conditions. Raising the credit spread by one standard deviation
corresponds to a post-buyout gain of 21.7 log points for targets relative to controls and an
30Similar results obtain when using the change from the buyout closing date in year t to March
of year t+ 2.
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increase in excess reallocation of 4.6 percent of buyout-year employment.
Thus, the credit spread effect on target-firm productivity growth is quite large and
is accompanied by a sizable increase in the pace of job reallocation inside target firms.
This pattern suggests that PE buyouts foster productivity gains by catalyzing creative
destruction within target firms. In unreported results, we directly examine the post-buyout
relationship between productivity growth and excess job reallocation and find that targets
with higher excess job reallocation enjoy higher productivity growth. These results echo
one of the chief findings in Davis et al. (2014) despite our use of a different productivity
measure, different empirical methods, and data for a much broader set of industries. Our
earlier study finds that buyouts lead to TFP gains at target firms in the manufacturing
sector, mainly due to the reallocation of activity from less productive plants to more
productive ones. Here, we find that high credit spreads at the time of the buyout lead
to greater productivity growth and greater reallocation activity in target firms in the two
years after the buyout. Both sets of results link buyout-induced productivity gains to an
accelerated, purposefully directed reallocation of activity within target firms.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how post-buyout productivity growth and excess reallocation at
target firms vary with credit spreads at the time of buyout. Evaluated at the sample mean
credit spread, Table 2.7 says that buyouts raise productivity by about 15 log points over
two years at targets relative to controls. The buyout-related productivity boost is more
than twice as large when the credit spread is one standard deviation about its sample mean.
Post-buyout excess reallocation also rises with the credit spread at target firms relative to
controls, as discussed above.
One interpretation of these patterns is that PE groups have multiple tools for earning
investment returns on their portfolio firms. When credit is cheap and easy, it is more
attractive to rely on financial engineering tools to generate returns, e.g., by issuing new
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debt to fund additional dividend payments to equity holders. When credit is costly and
tight, financial engineering is less attractive and PE groups focus more on generating
returns by cultivating operational improvements that raise productivity in portfolio firms.
This substitution between financial engineering and operational improvements may work
through the selection of buyout targets, through the way PE firms and senior managers in
portfolio firms allocate their time and attention, or through a combination of the two.
Turning to Table 2.8, faster GDP growth in the two-year interval after buyouts is associ-
ated with faster post-buyout employment growth at targets relative to controls and greater
excess reallocation. The effects are large, as seen in the last row: A unit standard deviation
rise in the post-buyout GDP growth rate comes with a gain in relative employment growth
at targets of 3.2 log points and a relative increase of 3.0 percent in excess employment
reallocation. A rise in credit spreads after buyouts involves slower employment growth
at targets relative to controls, slower organic growth, slower excess reallocation, higher
wage growth, and lower productivity growth. These shifts are statistically significant on
every margin. While the credit spread results in Table 8 are stronger than the results for
GDP growth, the outcome response pattern is the same. In unreported results, we also
find a broadly similar pattern when using equity market valuations to measure external
conditions.
Figure 2.3 illustrates how post-buyout employment growth and excess reallocation at
target firms vary relative to controls with the post-buyout evolution of external market
conditions. The baseline employment growth effects depicted in the center bars are of
modest size, in line with our results in Section 2.4. However, the relative post-buyout
employment performance of targets is highly sensitive to the evolution of market conditions.
For example, a post-buyout widening of credit spreads by two standard deviations lowers
the relative employment growth of targets by 5 log points. Excess reallocation rates at
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target firms are also highly sensitive to the post-buyout evolution of market conditions.
While not illustrated in the figure, the results in Table 2.8 also imply that post-buyout
productivity growth at targets rises strongly with an improvement in economic conditions
(faster GDP growth or shrinking credit spreads).
Post-buyout wage growth at targets is also sensitive to the evolution of credit conditions.
According to Column (9) in Table 2.8, a unit standard deviation widening of the credit
spread (440 basis points) in the two years after the buyout is associated with a relative
wage gain at targets of 1.4 log points. Whether this result reflects a compositional shift
in the workforce (e.g., layoffs concentrated among low-wage workers) or wage gains for
employees at target firms relative to those at control firms is an open question.
As the reader will have noted, high credit spreads when the buyout closes and widening
credit spreads after the buyout closes have very different relationships to the post-buyout
performance of targets. As we saw in Table 2.7, deals done during periods of high credit
spreads prove to have more productivity gains. But if credit spreads further increase after
the buyout, the effect goes the other way, as revealed in Table 2.8. This contrast might
seem anomalous. As noted above, PE groups may react to tight credit conditions by
choosing transactions that are conducive to operational improvements. If credit conditions
deteriorate post-buyout, however, they appear unable to switch gears to improving pro-
ductivity. Rather, the deteriorating conditions seem to translate into fewer productivity
gains (and more job losses). Given the pervasiveness of road-maps for future operational
plans prepared by PE groups as part of the due diligence process (e.g., Gompers et al.
(2016)), one possibility is that they get locked into a particular strategy, hampering their
ability to promptly shift course later if market conditions change after the purchase. As
we saw earlier, a post-buyout widening of credit spreads also brings slower pace of excess
reallocation at targets relative to controls.
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Given these intriguing results, Table 2.9 considers the role of post-buyout market con-
ditions by deal type. As we saw in Table 2.6, the employment response to buyouts differs
dramatically across deal types. Moreover, Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 show that the mix
of buyouts by deal type varies over the economic cycle. These remarks suggest that the
sensitivity of targets to the post-buyout evolution of external market conditions may also
differ by deal type.
As seen in Panel B of Table 2.9, a post-buyout widening of credit spreads brings relative
employment drops at target firms in private-to-private and secondary deals. A one standard
deviation rise in the spread over two years after the buyout is associated with a relative
employment drop of about 5 log points. The drop involves organic employment changes in
secondary deals. Lower post-buyout GDP growth is also associated with lower employment
growth (except for public-to-private deals), but the effects are not statistically significant
when cutting the sample by deal type.
The post-buyout evolution of market conditions shows a stronger relationship to excess
reallocation rates in target firms. In five out of eight reported regressions, we see that a
deterioration in external market conditions brings a significant decline in excess reallocation
at targets relative to controls. In only one (statistically insignificant) case does the effect
go in the opposite direction. Excess reallocation in target firms is especially sensitive to
the post-buyout evolution of market conditions for public-to-private and divisional deals.
The wages and productivity results in Table 2.9 highlight the special character of public-
to-private deals. In particular, in these deals a post-buyout deterioration in market condi-
tions brings greater wage growth and slower productivity growth at target firms compared
to controls. These effects are statistically significant and quite large, as seen in the last row
of each panel. Given the size and heavy debt loads of target firms in public-to-private deals
(Axelson et al., 2013), downturns place may place great stress on their restructuring plans.
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The combination of adverse market conditions and heavy indebtedness may hamper their
efforts to undertake productivity-improving changes. Normally, we might anticipate that
financial pressures on the firm would also translate into wage and benefit concessions by
workers (e.g., Matsa (2010), and Benmelech et al. (2012)). But in this setting the dynamics
may be more complex. For instance, a firm may be unable to sell units with high labor
costs when external conditions are weak, and it may lack the resources to finance a shift
in operations to new facilities with lower labor costs when debt burdens are too heavy.
2.6 Conclusion
In his presidential address to the American Finance Association, Zingales (Zingales,
2015) makes the case that we “cannot argue deductively that all finance is good [or bad].
To separate the wheat from the chaff, we need to identify the rent-seeking components
of finance, i.e., those activities that while profitable from an individual point of view are
not so from a societal point of view.” Our study takes up that challenge for private equity
buyouts, a financial enterprise that critics see as dominated by rent-seeking activities with
little in the way of societal benefits.
Our results show that it is highly misleading to speak about “the” social impact of
private equity. The real-side effects of buyouts vary greatly by deal type and with mar-
ket conditions. The effects of public-to-private buyouts are especially sensitive to market
conditions. Tighter credit market conditions when buyouts take place are associated with
greater post-buyout productivity gains at target firms (relative to control firms). This result
suggests a degree of substitution in the levers by which private equity groups create value
for their investors. Furthermore, our evidence that the relative impact of private equity on
employment is pro-cyclical, particularly for private-to-private and secondary investments,
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suggests a “PE multiplier effect” that may accentuate cyclical swings in economic activity.
Our paper also points to some important unanswered questions. Foremost among
these are whether and how the social impact of buyouts varies among private equity groups
themselves. In particular, do buyout effects vary with the experience and size of the private
equity group? Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that the financial performance varies across
private equity firms in a manner that persists from fund to fund. This pattern suggests that
real-side effects are also likely to differ across private equity firms in a persistent manner.
84
2.7 Tables and Figures
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Table 2.1: Market Conditions and Private Equity Buyout Frequency by Deal Type,
1980-2013
We regress the natural log of the count of PE buyouts in quarter t on deal-type indica-
tors interacted with market conditions at buyout close (top panel) and over the following
two years (bottom panel), while controlling for deal type and a linear time trend. To
characterize contemporaneous market conditions for buyouts that close in quarter t, we
consider whether the credit spread in t is above or below its sample median value and
whether real GDP growth from t-4 to t is above or below its median. Similarly, to char-
acterize the evolution of market conditions over the next two years, we consider whether
the change in the credit spread and real GDP from t to t+8 are above or below their
median values. Each regression has 454 observations. *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1.
86
Table 2.2: Private Equity Buyouts by Industry Sector and Deal Type, 1980-2013
Each column reports the percentage breakdown of buyouts for the indicated deal type,
using the Standard & Poors 2018 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).
NB: A test of the null hypothesis that the industry distribution of buyouts is independent
of deal type yields a Pearson Chi-squared statistic of 260.7 with a p-value of 0.000.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Private Equity Buyouts Matched to Census Micro
Data
Panel A considers all matched targets in our 1980-2013 sample period. Panel B consid-
ers buyouts in the 1980-2011 period, for which we can follow targets and their control
units for two years post buyout. Panel C considers the same period (1980-2003) cov-
ered by the analysis sample in Davis et al. (2014). Two-year continuers include tar-
get firms that shut down all establishments by the second year after the buyout year.
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Table 2.4: Buyout Effects on Employment, Wages, and Productivity
The sample contains firms that underwent private equity buyouts from 1980 to 2011 and
matching control firms in the same cells. Each row reports a single weighted least-squares
regression. The top row in Panel A reports the estimated buyout effect on the employ-
ment growth rate of target firms from the buyout year to two years later. The next row
isolates the buyout effect on the organic employment growth rate (i.e., excluding post-
buyout acquisitions and divestitures), and the remaining rows break out particular em-
ployment adjustment margins. Panels B and C report buyout effects on firm-level wage
and revenue productivity growth. All specifications include a full set of cell-level fixed
effects and controls for pre-buyout growth histories, as described in the main text. See
Section II in the main text for an explanation of how and why we weight observations.
The regressions in panels B and C exclude firms that exit within two years after the
buyout. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
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Table 2.5: Buyout Effects on Firm-Level Job Reallocation and Excess Reallocation
The sample contains firms that underwent private equity buyouts from 1980 to 2011
and matching control firms in the same cells. Each row reports a single weighted
least-squares regression. The dependent variable is the excess reallocation rate or
job reallocation rate computed from establishment-level employment changes between
the buyout year t and t+2. The key independent variable is a dummy equal to
one for buyout targets. All specifications include a full set of cell-level fixed ef-
fects and controls for pre-buyout growth histories, as described in the text. See Sec-
tion II in the text for an explanation of how and why we weight observations. All
Margins captures the Organic Margins plus post-buyout acquisitions and divestitures.
Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets. *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1.
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Table 2.6: How Buyout Effects Vary by Deal Type
This table follows Tables 4 and 5 except for reporting results by deal
type, as indicated in the column headings. See notes to Tables 4
and 5 for additional information. *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1.
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Table 2.7: How Buyout Effects Vary with Market Conditions Near the Closing Date
The sample contains firms that underwent private equity buyouts from 1980 to 2011 and
matching control firms in the same cells. Each column reports a single weighted least-
squares regression. Moving from left to right across columns, the dependent variable is
the firm-level employment growth rate from buyout year t to t+2, the organic part of the
firm-level employment growth rate over the same interval, the excess job reallocation rate
from t to t+2, the log change in the wage (annual earnings per worker) from t to t+2, and
the log change in revenue productivity from t to t+2. The key independent variables are
a dummy for whether the observation is a buyout target, a measure of market conditions
when the buyout closed, and the interaction between the two. Columns (1)-(5) use real
GDP growth to measure market conditions, and columns (6)-10) use the credit spread).
We adjust the measures of market conditions to mean zero in the regression sample. All
specifications include a full set of cell-level fixed effects and controls for pre-buyout growth
histories. See Section II in the text for an explanation of how and why we weight obser-
vations. The final row presents the estimated effect of a unit standard deviation positive
shock to market conditions on the dependent variable for buyout targets relative to control
units. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets. *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1
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Table 2.8: How Buyout Effects Vary with Changes in Market Conditions in the Two
Years after Closing
The sample contains firms that underwent private equity buyouts from 1980 to 2011 and
matching control firms in the same cells. Each column reports a single weighted least-
squares regression. Moving from left to right across columns, the dependent variable is the
firm-level employment growth rate from buyout year t to t+2, the organic part of the firm-
level employment growth rate over the same interval, the excess job reallocation rate from t
to t+2, the log change in the wage (annual earnings per worker) from t to t+2, and the log
change in revenue productivity from t to t+2. The key independent variables are a dummy
for whether the observation is a buyout target and an interaction between the buyout
dummy and a measure of the change in macroeconomic conditions from the buyout year
t to t+2. after the transaction closing date. Regressions in the first (second) five columns
use the GDP growth rate (credit spread) to measure macroeconomic conditions. We adjust
the market conditions measures to mean zero in the regression sample. All specifications
include a full set of cell-level fixed effects and controls for pre-buyout growth histories. See
Section II in the text for an explanation of how and why we weight observations. The
final row presents the estimated effect of a one standard deviation positive shock to the
macroeconomic variable on the dependent variable for buyout targets relative to control
units. Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets; *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.
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Table 2.9: How Buyout Effects by Deal Type Vary with Changes in Market Condi-
tions in the Two Years after Closing
The sample contains firms that underwent private equity buyouts from 1980
to 2011 and matching control firms in the same cells. Each column reports
a single weighted least-squares regression for the indicated dependent vari-
able, deal type and post-buyout change in market conditions. See notes
to Table 8 for additional information. *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1.
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Figure 2.1: Quarterly Buyout Counts by Deal Type, 1980 to 2013.
Each panel shows buyout closings for the indicated deal type in quarter t,
overlaid with the contemporaneous credit spread and the log change in real
GDP from t-4 to t. We exclude about 300 buyouts that we cannot clas-
sify as to deal type. See Section 1.A for an explanation of how we construct
of our sample of 9,794 leveraged buyouts sponsored by private equity firms.
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Figure 2.2: How the Post-Buyout Rates of Productivity Growth and Excess Reallo-
cation of Targets Vary with the Credit Spread on the Buyout Date
This chart uses the estimated coefficient on the credit spread interaction effects
in Table 7 to depict how target outcomes over the two years after the buyout
vary with credit spreads at the time of the buyout. Center bars show baseline
effects on rates of productivity growth and excess reallocation when the credit
spread equals its sample mean. The other bars show buyout effects on targets for
credit spread values -2, -1, 1 and 2 standard deviations about the sample mean.
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Figure 2.3: How the Post-Buyout Rates of Employment Growth and Excess Reallo-
cation of Targets Vary with the Post-Buyout Evolution of Market Condition
The top panel shows the impact of changes in credit spreads on out-
comes. The bottom panel shows the impact of GDP changes. These
results are based on Table 8. The bars graphing the effects are cen-
tered on the Average Treatment Effect at the mean 2 standard deviations.
CHAPTER III
U.S. Industrial Composition and the Labor Share
3.1 Introduction
The falling labor share is a well documented phenomenon by now (Elsby et al., 2013;
Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013). While, researchers have been trying to uncover the eco-
nomic phenomena underlying this decline, they have yet to find many convincing answers.
One possible explanation for the falling labor is the evolving make-up of the U.S. economy;
the shift of output from manufacturing to services could reallocate output from high labor
share to low labor share sectors of the economy. This paper examines this explanation for
the falling labor share.
To do so, this paper first examines some of the assumptions that go into creating the
Penn World Table’s measure of U.S. labor share.1 The assumptions underlying the PWT’s
treatment of the self-employed is an important component of the labor share calculation
and inflates the labor share above just compensation paid to employees. The paper then
decomposes changes in the labor share two ways - first into changes because of the shifting
1the PWT’s labor share calculation is one of the most frequently cited.
100
101
sectoral composition of the U.S. economy and then into changes due to changing compen-
sation ratios, due to changing self-employed output and changes due to output allocation.
Using BEA data on sectoral output and compensation to examine the composition
of the U.S. economy shows that the falling labor share is not attributable to the U.S.
economy’s shift from a manufacturing to a services economy. This finding should assuage
fears that the U.S.’s shift towards services is harming workers (in terms of aggregate labor
share); there are, of course, other possible problems with this economic shift. A counter-
factual shows that the biggest part of the labor share’s decline due to manufacturing is its
within-sector labor share as opposed to economic shifts away from manufacturing. After
examining the shifting composition of the economy, the paper goes on the examining the
other components of the changing labor share.
Over the period of study, the labor share’s fall is due entirely to within-industry changes
in the compensation ratio. Both self-employed output and the shifting composition of the
economy act to bolster the labor share. This finding suggests that any theory on the falling
labor share must first look within industries and second explain why wages are failing to
grow at the same rate as nominal output, e.g. there must be some explanation for the
wages’ failure to adjust for higher productivity, in the case of increased technology, or
otherwise introduce some sort of labor market friction that prevents wages’ adjustment.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 discusses related work; Section 3.3
describes the construction of the various decompositions in the paper; Section 3.4 presents
results and analysis; and Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Relationship to the Literature
This paper shows that the labor’s decline is entirely due to changes in within-industry
compensation and that the reallocation of the U.S. economy towards services has actually
dampened the labor share’s fall. Additionally, because of the BEA data used it covers the
entire economy. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)’s study, among the first to spot the
falling global labor share, focuses exclusively on the corporate sector to avoid the issues
of measuring the labor shares of the self employed and of home produced output. Using
KLEMS data and a regression decomposition, they show that the labor share’s fall is largely
within the industries they examine but they do not have full industrial coverage nor do
they show output reallocation’s positive effect on the labor share. They further argue that
cheaper investment prices have shifted production towards more capital intensive modes of
production and this shift has hurt the labor share. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) argue
similarly.
Elsby et al. (2013) state that approximately a third of the decline in the labor share
comes from mismeasured self-employed output. They further argue that the stability of the
labor share in the past masked within-industry heterogeneity and that workers’ bargaining
power does not drive the falling labor share. These results are broadly in line with the
results of this study. My study also shows heterogeneity across industries and demonstrates
its importance for the overall analisys of the labor share. I go farther and demonstrate
how the within-industry heterogeneity in labor share directly affects the aggregate.
Some recent papers have argued that industrial concentration explains this decreased
worker bargaining power. Autor et al. (2017) were the first to show that industrial output
has been getting more concentrated and present a model in which this concentration leads
to lower aggregate fixed costs - and a lower labor share. However, they do not address
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bargaining power directly and examine industrial concentration at a nation, as opposed to
local, level. Rinz (2018) and Lipsius (2018) show that when measured locally, concentra-
tion has been going down. Whether or not nationally calculated industrial concentrations
are related to employee bargaining power is an open question. If bargaining power really
is a driver of the falling labor share, then economists must offer and analyze an explana-
tion outside of labor-market concentration, such as de-unionization, or explain why local
concentration is a less good indicator of labor market power than national concentration.
Most closely related to this paper is Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010). While they say
they show that falls in the labor share are mainly driven by within-industry changes, their
analysis is focused primarily on manufacturing. This result misses the dynamics in other
industries such as services. Manufacturing itself is an ever-shrinking part of the U.S., and
global, economies and therefore dynamics there do not necessarily reflect broader economic
phenomena. This study uses all the sectors of the U.S. economy to bypass these worries.
3.3 Data and Concepts
The main source of data for this analysis is the BEA’s GDP-by-Industry components
data series. These data contain the total value added produced by U.S. industries and then
divides them into three sub-categories: total labor compensation, taxes and subsidies, and
total surplus. These categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive so that within each
industry, i, and for each year, t,
V Ait = Cit + Sit + Tit
where V Ait is total value added, Cit is labor compensation, Sit is surplus and Tit is taxes.
These data are available back to 1987. There is a break in the data in 1997. The post-
104
’97 data were harmonized with the 2012 NAICS (North American Industrial Classification
System) industrial reclassification while the pre-’97 data have not been. The main results
for this paper use these inconsistent data series but all regressions include a pre-’97 fixed
effect to absorbed this difference.
This paper divides the economy into eight sectors: manufacturing; services; agriculture,
forestry, fishing, hunting, and mining (rural industries); transport, warehousing, utilities,
and construction (TWUC); wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate
(FIRE); and government, which includes local, state and federal expenditures. These
sectors are meant to reflect the sectors in ?.2 The BEA data, however, provide more
granular industrial data for some of these sectors. Table 3.1 shows how the industries
within the BEA data are aggregated into the appropriate sectors. Within each sector, the
industries’ components of value added are summed to create the sector’s value added and
its subsequent components. The output-weighted average of each sector’s compensation











These compensation ratios, however, are not labor shares. Compensation ratios need to
be adjusted for what Feenstra et al. (2015) call “mixed income.” As they explain “Mixed
income is the total income earned by self-employed workers, so it is a combination of capital
and labor income.” Mixed income data, however, do not exist for individual industries.
Instead, this paper calculates a national-level adjustment that can be applied to the BEA
compensation ratio data and, mathematically, applies to each industry individually.
2? uses manufacturing, services, retail trade, wholesale trade, utilities and transportation, and
finance.
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The first step in calculating this compensation ratio adjustment factor is to examine
compensation ratios from both the BEA data and from the Penn World Table (PWT).
Figure 3.1a shows the compensation shares for the full economy calculated from the BEA
data and from the PWT. The bottom dashed line shows the time series of BEA full economy
compensation ratio. Feenstra et al. (2015) explains that when calculating the labor share
for the PWT, “net taxes on products are excluded since this is not income accruing to any
of the factor inputs but a direct transfer to the government.” The top solid line shows the
BEA compensation ratio adjusted for taxes. In keeping with the PWT, the value added
is adjusted by subtracting taxes from it. After the adjustment, the compensation ratio
becomes
Ct
V At − Tt
.
This adjustment then increases the percentage of output that goes to compensating labor,
explaining the increase in the compensation ratio. The final, dotted line lying between the
two BEA data series is the PWT compensation ratio. While this series does not line up
directly with the adjusted BEA compensation ratio, its correlation with the series is .999.
Figure 3.1b shows the total compensation share and the adjusted compensation share cal-
culated only for private industries (excluding government output and employment), and the
PWT compensation share. The private industry compensation share lies below the PWT
compensation share both before and after the tax adjustment. Because the PWT series
lies between the full economy compensation series and strictly above the private industry,
compensation series, this study will use the full economy, tax adjusted compensation ratio
to create the labor share series.
From the compensation ratios, there are several possible adjustments for mixed income
and the particular adjustment appropriate to an economy depends heavily on the particular
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features of that economy. The PWT chooses to assume that the labor share for mixed
income is the same as the labor share for compensation income. This assumption leads it
to adjust the economy-wide value of GDP by subtracting all of the output generated from





where α is the labor share, Compt is the total compensation to labor in time t, GDPt is
the tax-adjusted total output in t and Mt is total mixed income in t. Neither the BEA
data nor the PWT give information about the amount of output generated from the self-
employed. However, because it provides both the compensation share ComptGDPt and the labor
share, the PWT provides enough information to back out the economy-wide percentage of
output generated by the self employed. The difference between the labor share and the
compensation share is equal to the compensation share times the ratio of self-employed











Writing Mt as a percentage of output, Mt = γtGDPt or γt =
Mt
GDPt






























γt, the percentage of total output generated by the self employed is 1 minus the ratio of
the compensation share to the labor share. Figure 3.2 shows how γt, calculated from the
PWT data, has evolved over the period of study. While the percentage of output generated
by the self employed is always between 6% and 8%, it never drops below 7% after the mid
’90s. 11−γt is the ratio of the total economy to the percentage of output not generated by
the self-employed. This value will act as the inflator transforming the compensation ratios
into labor shares. The proper adjustment is implied by equation 3.4. This adjustment
factor is increasing in γt. Applying it to the BEA compensation ratio creates the implied
BEA labor share. Figure 3.3 graphs the implied BEA labor share and the PWT labor
share. The gap between the two series represents two things, the initial gap between the
compensation ratios presented in Figure 3.1a and the slight change in correlation between
the two series. While the BEA adjusted-compensation ratio has a .999 correlation with
the PWT compensation ratio, the BEA implied labor share has a .954 correlation with the
PWT U.S. labor share. Both series show a sharp drop in the labor from 2000 to 2014: the
BEA implied labor share drops from .66 to .62 while the PWT labor share drops from .64
to about .60. Additionally, both series are lower in 2014 than they are in 1987, though the
difference is smaller than the difference from the highs.
The BEA implied labor share is, then, the product of the adjustment factor in equa-
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1−γt . Constructing the labor share this way implies that changes in the labor
share are driven by changes in the economy’s compensation ratio and the amount of total















The terms in equation 3.6 are the change in the labor share due to the change in the
underlying compensation ratio weighted by the adjustment factor and due to the change
in the adjustment factor weighted by initial compensation ratio. This decomposition says
that as either the percentage of output generated by the self-employed increases (δt > δt−1)
or as the compensation ratio increases, so does the labor share.
The changes in the compensation ratio can be further decomposed into the changes due
to within-sector changes in the compensation ratio and the changes due to between-sector
reallocation of output. Because the compensation ratio is the output-weighted average of


























































The first term of this decomposition is the change in the sectors’ average level of the com-
pensation ratio. It measures how within-sector changes in the compensation share affect
the aggregate compensation ratio. Melitz and Polanec call the second term the covariance
between output share and compensation ratio. Calling this the covariance is a slight abuse





are market shares, they essen-
tially already incorporate the division by the number of [sectors].” The covariance term
measures how the aggregate composition ratio changes because of between-sector realloca-
tion of output. Shifting output from low compensation ratio sectors to high compensation
ratio sectors will increase the aggregate compensation ratio while shifting output away
from high compensation ratio sectors towards lower compensation ratio sectors will lower
the aggregate compensation ratio. Section 3.4 will examine how compensation ratio and
output shares have evolved over the time of the study and examine how much each of these
components have contributed to the overall change in the labor share.
Combining equations 3.6 and 3.7, the change in the labor share is composed of three
terms, a term driven by changes in average compensation ratio, a term driven by changes

























While the changing labor share can be decomposed into the three components just
discussed. It can also be decomposed into industry changes. The aggregate labor share is
the output weighted average of the labor shares within each industry:
outputi∑8
i=1 outputi
· Labor Sharei (3.9)
for each industry i. Here, the two components of change are an industry’s weight within
the economy and the industry’s labor share itself. Section 3.4.1 will examine how the
changing composition of the U.S. economy contributes to the falling labor share. A further
examination of how macroeconomic conditions affect particular industries and their labor
shares is beyond the scope of this paper but is an interesting topic.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Changing Economy
Figure 3.4 shows the within-industry changes in the compensation ratio and labor share.
By construction, the labor share is always above the compensation share. Other than
Services (3.4a) and Government (3.4h), all industries experience falls in the compensation
ratio. The most significant falls come in Manufacturing and Wholesale Trade. Figures 3.4c
and 3.4d show these time series. Manufacturing’s compensation ratio falls from about .65 to
about .50 over the analysis period. Wholesale Trade’s falls from about .71 to about .55. In
both of these industries, employees’ compensation, as a percentage of total output, fell by
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15+ percentage points. Other notable features of the various time series are the precipitous
drop in FIRE compensation share that coincides with the 2009 financial crisis (3.4f) and
the fall in Rural Industries’ compensation share seems to coincide with the tech-bubble in
the early 2000s but Rural Industries’ compensation share has recovered slightly since the
financial crisis. Both Services and Government have had slight increases in compensation
ratio over the time examined.
Figure 3.5 shows the percent of the economy each industry comprises. Here we can
see how the U.S. economy has changed significantly over the last 30 years. In 1987, Man-
ufacturing output made up almost 20% of total U.S. output but by 2014 that was down
to about 12% (3.5c). Over the same period, the share of output comprised of Services
rose from about 24% to about 32% (3.5a). This 8 percentage point increase in Services al-
most exactly equals Manufacturing’s decline. FIRE gains a little under 3% of output-share
(3.4f). Its output share grows more quickly than Services’ and peaks in the early 2000s.
At the time of the dot-com bubble (∼2000) and the time of the financial crisis (∼2009)
there are big drops in FIRE’s output share which only recover by 2014. Wholesale Trade
(3.5d) gains less than 1 percentage point of output while Retail; Utilities, Construction,
and Transportation; and Government all lose about less than 2 percentage points of out-
put. Interestingly, Rural industries are almost flat. After a large decrease in the 9́0s, these
industriesśhare of output recovers completely and by the end of the sample period exceeds
its starting value, albeit by less than half a percentage point.
Figure 3.6 shows how the results in Figures 3.4 & 3.5 interact. It shows the time series
of each industries contribution to the labor share i.e. Figure 3.6 plots
outputi∑8
i=1 outputi
· Labor Sharei (3.10)
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for each industry i. Panel 3.6c shows that Manufacturing is contributing almost 7 per-
centage points less to labor share in 2014 than it did 1987. However, this fall is counter
balanced by a nearly identical rise in Services’ overall labor share contribution (Panel 3.6a).
Outside of Services, however, only FIRE (Panel 3.6f) has a higher contribution to labor
share in 2014 than in 1987. All other sectors (other than Rural Industries), act as a drag
on the aggregate labor share. (Panels 3.6d, 3.6b, 3.6e, 3.6h,& 3.6f). By the end of the
period the sector with the smallest change in labor-share contribution is Rural Industries.
This fact, however, masks a huge dip early ’90s and then a steady climb in labor share
contribution since. That said, Rural Industries are a relatively minor component of the
labor share, contributing about 1/20th the amount of labor share that Services does.
Breaking out the Sectors’ contributions like this allows us to think of counterfactuals.
If, for example, there was no decline in Manufacturing’s within-sector labor share, then, all
else equal, the labor share in 2014 would be about 2.5 percentage points higher and people
might not be so worried about the falling labor share. Similarly, if the sectoral make up
of the U.S. economy remained the same as in 1987 and only Manufacturing’s within-sector
labor share changed, the aggregate labor share in 2014 would be almost 5 percentage points
higher. Here we see that the main driver of the falling labor share is not the shift away
from high-labor share industries but is within industry dynamics.
3.4.2 Components of a Changing Labor Share
Figure 3.7 shows that the, approximately, 2 percentage point fall in the labor share from
1987 to 2014 is due entirely to the falling compensation ratio within industries, which has
been partially counteracted by increases in labor share due to reallocation towards higher
compensation ratio industries and increases in labor share due to self-employed output. The
first bar in the graph (blue) shows the overall change in the labor share over the covered
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period. Overall, the labor share had declined about 2 percentage points in the period. The
second bar (orange) is the change in the labor share due to the change in the covariance
term in Equation 3.8. It shows that the output reallocation has actually counteracted other
drags on the labor share by pushing the labor share up over 1 percentage point. This result
should assuage fears that (part of) the falling labor share has to do with the U.S. economy’s
shift away from manufacturing towards services. If this were the case, then changes in the
labor share due to reallocation would be negative. Instead, the evidence suggests that the
move away from manufacturing has actually bolstered the labor share over this period.
The third bar (green) shows the fall in labor share attributable to changes in the within-
industry average compensation ratio. The fall in the compensation ratio over this time is
almost 5 percentage points. The final bar (red) is the change in labor share due to changes
in the percent of output created by the self employed. The shift to self employment has also
counteracted the drag on the labor share of average compensation ratios and has boosted
the labor share by over 1 percentage point as well. These taken together, then, demonstrate
that the falling labor share since 1987 is entirely due to changes in compensation ratios
within industries, counteracted by reallocation and self-employment.
The results for the whole period, however, do mask some heterogeneity. Figure 3.8
divides 1987-2014 period into 6 sub-periods and displays the change in the labor share and
its constituent components in each. While the labor share does not fall in each subperiod,
the labor share changes are driven mostly by changes in the composition share (green).
In each subperiod the change due to the compensation share is the component with the
biggest absolute value. The change in the compensation ratio is positive in only 2 of the
6 subperiods (‘87-‘91 and ‘97-‘01). Additionally, changes in variance and changes due to
self-employed output seem to act as a counterbalance to changes in the compensation ratio,
most of the time. In 4 of the 6 subperiods, both of these changes have the opposite sign
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of the changes in compensation ratio (‘87-‘91, ‘92-‘96, ‘07-‘11, and ‘12-‘14). Interestingly,
changes in covariance are only a headwind to the labor share in the very earliest period of
the study (‘87-‘91). For the whole rest of the studied period, it acts as a tail wind, pushing
the labor share up.
3.5 Conclusion
Questions about the falling labor share are important for economists to answer. This
paper attempts to examine the relationship between the falling labor share and other
macroeconomic indicators by decomposing the labor share and examining the constituent
pieces. In doing so, this paper shows that the falling labor share is due to decreases in
within industry labor share while output reallocation and self-employed output have worked
towards bolstering the labor share.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
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Figure 3.1: Change in Compensation Share
118
Figure 3.2: Labor Share Inflator
Figure 3.3: Economy Wide Labor Share
119
(a) Services (b) Utilities, Construction, and Trans-
portation
(c) Manufacturing (d) Wholesale Trade
(e) Retail Trade (f) FIRE
(g) Rural Industries (h) Government
Figure 3.4: Sector Labor Shares
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(a) Services (b) Utilities, Construction, and Trans-
portation
(c) Manufacturing (d) Wholesale Trade
(e) Retail Trade (f) FIRE
(g) Rural Industries (h) Government
Figure 3.5: Sector Economy Shares
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(a) Services (b) Utilities, Construction, and Trans-
portation
(c) Manufacturing (d) Wholesale Trade
(e) Retail Trade (f) FIRE
(g) Rural Industries (h) Government
Figure 3.6: Contribution of each Sector to Aggregate Labor Share
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Figure 3.7: Total Change in Labor Share and Constituents





Chapter II supporting material
A.1 Sample Construction and Matching
A.1.1 Overview
We combine information on private equity buyouts from CapitalIQ and other sources
with firm-level and establishment-level data held by the U.S. Census Bureau. We start
by matching buyout deals to target firms and their establishments in the Census Bureaus
comprehensive Business Register (BR). Our basic approach is as follows. First, we use
name and address information to match a particular deal to a specific unit in the BR.
Because the matching algorithm relies partly on address information, this step identifies a
specific establishment owned by the target firm, which is often but not always a headquar-
ters facility. Second, we use the BR link between that establishments ID and its parent
firm ID to identify the target firm in the BR. In most cases, this method identifies the
target firm in the BR and all of its establishments.
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After matching to the BR, we use the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) essen-
tially a longitudinal version of the BR to follow target firms and their establishments over
time. We also use the LBD to identify control units (comparable firms and establishments)
and to follow them over time as well. In addition, we exploit common alphanumeric iden-
tifiers to incorporate other Census micro data for some aspects of our analysis.
The LBD tracks establishments and parent firms using a combination of administrative
records and survey collections that include the Company Organization Survey (COS), the
Economic Censuses, and the Annual Surveys of Businesses (e.g., the Annual Survey of
Manufactures). Information about company structure is incorporated into the LBD by
attaching firm identifiers to records for establishments. Ownership changes are identified
when establishments switch parent firm through mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures.
The Census Bureau assigns a unique firm ID to all establishments under common
ownership and control in a given year, including establishments that belong to subsidiaries
under control of the parent corporation. This firm ID is distinct from a taxpayer ID such as
the employer identification number (EIN). The relationships among the various IDs are as
follows. In any given year, an establishment is uniquely associated with a single taxpayer
ID and a single firm ID. Moreover, each taxpayer ID is uniquely associated with a firm
ID. For multi-establishment firms, a parent firm ID has multiple affiliated establishment
IDs and potentially multiple EINs. Put differently, the EIN as a unit of observation is
somewhere between an establishment and a firm.
A.1.2 Matching Buyout Targets to the Business Register (BR)
From Capital IQ and other sources, we obtain several pieces of information about the
acquired entity in a private equity buyout. These pieces include the name of the seller, the
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name of the acquisition target, the targets address, and the acquisition date. The seller and
target are typically the same in whole-firm acquisitions but not in partial-firm acquisitions
for example, when the private equity firm acquires one division of a multi-division company.
We match acquisition targets to firms in the BR using the data matching algorithms
that are part of the SAS DQMatch procedure. This is an improved version of the matching
code we developed and implemented algorithm used in Davis et al. (2014). Our DQMatch
implementation proceeds through 16 rounds of matching from the strictest criteria (re-
quiring a perfect match on name and address) to progressively looser criteria that allow
for fuzzier matching (exact name and fuzzy address, fuzzy name and exact address, exact
name and zip code, etc.) Results from each pass are flagged and the results are stored for
use in later analyses. For brevity, we do not discuss the DQMatch matching criteria and
the algorithm used to identify matches in detail.1 Here, we describe our overall matching
strategy, explain how we resolve buyout deals that match to multiple target firm candidates
in the BR, and discuss issues that arise in tracking firms over time.
A Simple Case
Suppose a private equity firm acquires firm A in its entirety during year t and places
it under new ownership, possibly with a new name. A simplified version of our matching
algorithm in this case works as follows: First, we find an establishment in the BR as of
year t located at the target address and owned by a firm with the target name. Second,
with this match in hand, we use the firm-establishment links in the BR to identify the full
set of establishments operated by the target firm in t. From this point, we can measure the
1Programs to implement the DQMatch algorithm and master batch files to run them are available
on the computing cluster servers in the Federal Statistical Research Data Centers.
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activity of the target firm in t and follow the firm (and its establishments) forward from t
using the LBD.
Challenges that Arise in the Matching Process
In practice, several challenges arise in the matching process. First, because name and
address data are noisy, we may find multiple BR firms that are candidate matches for the
acquisition target.2 All but one of these candidates, and perhaps all of them, are false
positives.
Second, to cope with timing differences between datasets, we search for matches in
the BR over a three-year window centered on the buyout year. While this approach can
pick up good matches that we would otherwise miss, it can also introduce additional false
positive matches. Whenever we have multiple candidate matches, we need some way to
resolve to a unique match. When we cannot do so with sufficient confidence, we drop the
acquisition target from our analysis.
Third, it can be hard to distinguish the seller firm from the acquisition target in some
cases. For example, suppose a private equity firm acquires establishments e1 and e2 from
firm A to form a new firm B in year t. In this case, the activity of establishments e1
and e2 are associated with both firms A and B in t, because each firm files tax records
that cover e1 and e2 for part of the year. Thus, when we match the target address to an
establishment, that establishment may link to two parent firms in the BR in the buyout
2We use both physical and mailing address from the Business Register when available to generate
matches. There is some noise in the addresses for new units in the Business Register that is typically
resolved in an Economic Census. Our use of a multi-year window should help overcome some of
this source of noise. Note that we did not find that our match rates had peaks in Census years
suggesting this is not a major issue.
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year. In this situation as well, we need some way to resolve to a unique match.
Fourth, some private equity buyouts involve complex reorganizations of target entities
that lead to the creation of multiple new firms or the piecemeal sale of the target entity to
multiple parties. In these cases, even when we successfully match the target address to an
establishment and correctly identify that establishments parent firm, we may identify and
track only some of the establishments acquired as part of the buyout. Indeed, there can be
multiple true successor firms to the target entity in such cases, and we may capture and
track only one of them.
Fifth, another challenge involves divisional buyouts, whereby the private equity firm
acquires only part of a multi-division firm. For divisional buyouts, we could not always
identify the correct target firm in the BR after matching the deal to a specific establish-
ment. These instances arose because, in some cases, the Census firm ID associated with
the matched establishments did not change to reflect the ownership change of the division
involved in the buyout deal. We identified these problematic cases by observing that the
matched target establishment remained affiliated with the parent seller firm even after the
buyout transaction. It is our understanding that the Census Bureau on occasion had dif-
ficulty tracking the new firm in divisional buyouts because of nonresponse on the COS or
other survey instruments.
We thus had two types of divisional cases. The first are those where we could accu-
rately identify the target firm using our main method, and the second where we could not.
Even in those cases, we were able to link the matched establishment to at least a part
of the target firm through the EIN (taxpayer ID). The complete target firm may or may
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not be identified in such cases, because the divisional business involved in the buyout may
have operated with multiple EINs. In the main text and this appendix, we refer to such
cases as EIN cases. In these EIN cases, we can accurately identify a part of the target firm
in the transaction year and at least some of the corresponding target establishments, but
we cannot be confident that we captured the entire target firm. We exclude EIN cases in
our firm-level longitudinal analyses, because the EIN is not suitable for tracking firms over
time. For example, if a target firm (i.e., an EIN case) creates or acquires a new establish-
ment, it may obtain a new EIN for that establishment for accounting or tax reasons. In
such cases, we would not know that the new establishment is part of the target firm.
We develop a methodology that takes advantage of the timing of the acquisition event
and the time series properties of the associated firms to identify the target. Our strategy
then requires we match the target name and address to a window of years around the
acquisition event. For each target we match their information to the BR at time of acqui-
sition, t, and to t+ 1 and t− 1. In addition to the history of activity, we also exploit the
employer tax identifier, the EIN, of the firms associated with the target.3
How We Proceed
We describe our process for de-duplicating the buyout transactions that are matched
to multiple Census firm IDs by separating them into a set of mutually exclusive cases.
No Matches In about 2000 of the 9794 deals in CapitalIQ, no companies within the BR
matched even using the loosest matching criterion.
Unique Matches As previously described, the search algorithm first proceeds through 16
3The EIN is an employer tax identifier that may or may not change when ownership changes.
It is often helpful in matching and tracking target firms and establishments involved in complex
reorganizations.
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rounds of matching using progressively less strict match criteria. A unique match is a
match to a single firm identifier in the strictest match criterion available for that deal.
For example, suppose a buyout transaction target from CapitalIQ matches to a single BR
entry in round 4 of our algorithm. If it also matches to multiple firms in subsequent, less
strict rounds, but had no matches until round 4, then this entry is a unique match. From
the initial 9794 deals in CapitalIQ, we find about 4000 unique matches.
Non-Unique Matches and De-Duplications The remaining set of about 3500 deals from
CapitalIQ match to multiple firms within the round where the strictest match criterion
is applied. This could happen, for example, if we exact match on address, but there are
multiple firms in a single building with similar company names. We use several methods
to arrive at a unique match between the CapitalIQ and a Census firm ID.
The first method for de-duplicating our dataset is to check the EINs of the matched
firms. In about 25 percent of the duplicate, matches matched to multiple firms with the
same EIN. This possibility arises given our use of the three-year window and is an indicator
that M&A and/or reorganization activity is underway. This enables us to link the multiple
matches and we follow the continuing firmid when calculating employment growth rates,
etc.
The second method for de-duplicating or data is to exploit the timing pattern of the
matches. We look for cases with at least two firms associated with the same deal. A
common pattern is that one of them is a birth of a new firm ID at time t or t+1 and
the other is a death at time t-1 or t. In this context, a birth is when a firm ID appears
at time t or t + 1 and that firm ID did not exist in the preceding years (t − 1 if the
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birth is in t or t − 1 and t if the birth is in t + 1) and a death is when a firm ID disap-
pears in time t or t + 1. We investigated these patterns and determined they are likely
to indicate PE-precipitated reorganization. These firm IDs were already matched using
name and addressing matching criteria, so that they are not simply spurious patterns in
the data. This second step uniquely resolves about 200 additional firm IDs to a transaction.
The third method follows four rules we developed to help resolve duplicate matches.
Rule 1: Within a set of duplicates, we choose the firm ID that has the strictest match
criteria. For example, if we have a duplicate match and one firm identifier has an
exact name and address match and a different firm identifier only matches on the
name, we resolve the duplicate by keep the highest quality match.
Rule 2: We choose the firm IDs with the strictest match criteria and condition on survival
to period t+1 in the LBD.
Rule 3: We apply Rule 2, but then also include resolutions from Rule 1 that may not
have survived into t+1.
Rule 4: We change the order of operations. We condition on survival to period t+1, then
choose the match that satisfies the strictest matching criteria.
When all four of these rules resolve to the same firm, we consider that firm to be the match
and use it in our analysis. These rules uniquely resolve about 1000 additional deals to a
Census firm ID. Combined, these resolution criteria yield approximately 2000 additional
matched deals. This gives us the total sample of approximately 6000 matched deals.
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